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Ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι, μιᾷ ψυχῇ
συναθλοῦντες τῇ πίστει τοῦ εὐαγγελίου

Phil. 1:27

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SCRIPTURE REVISITED: OR A SECOND LOOK AT THE MATTER

The Sacred Scriptures are so frequently treated in small, isolated, fragmented sections that one is apt to miss the constant effervescence of divine providence on the surface of their pages. A line understood here, a parable there and a collection of names in another place are apt to cause one to overlook the beauty of its integrity. Perhaps too frequently have the Scriptures been used simply to enliven a sermon, or to buttress a truth and have not been presented with the warmth and force which touched the minds of the walkers on the road to Emmaus. Some would doubt the liberality of the preceding sentence and question whether the Scriptures as explained in modern commentaries and periodical articles tend to make the reader unduly cautious and skeptical of his own competence. Let it be affirmed at the outset that the Scriptures were intended to be read and applied to life long before the origin of the academic degree. They were committed to the Church not merely for safekeeping, but for daily use in the sanctification of the faithful. They were written for uncomplicated people intent on knowing, loving and serving God as were the Ethiopian eunuch instructed by St. Philip, the lame beggar cured at the temple gate, the conniving Ananias and Sapphira, the guileless St. Stephen, the honest centurion Cornelius, and the excitable Rhoda who slammed the door on the fugitive, St. Peter. They were written also for the complicated symbolists of Alexandria, the liberalists of Antioch, the sophists of the Athenian Areopagus, the legalists of Rome and the man of the second millennium. The Bible is a simple and a complex book intended for both the common man and the scholar. This thought is expressed most beautifully in the sixth book of the Confessions of St. Augustine:

> Indeed the authority of Scripture seemed to be more to be revered and more worthy of devoted faith in that it was at once a book that all could read and read easily, and yet preserved the majesty of its mystery in the deepest part of its meaning: for it offers to all in the plainest words and the simplest expressions, yet demands the closest attention of the most serious minds.[1]

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[1] *Confessiones*, Lib. VI, c. 5, *MPL*, 32: 723.

In contrast to this thought is the observation of Henry Ward Beecher:

> The Bible is the most betrashed book in the world. Coming to it through commentaries is much like looking at a landscape through garret windows, over which generations of unmolested spiders have spun their webs.[2]

Perhaps Beecher had read the wrong commentaries. Scriptural articles should be designed to shed light rather than confusion. They should enable those capable of grasping their contents to build and expand their knowledge. We need articulate commentators and expounders else we fall into the situation described by St. Jerome:

> You cannot make your way into Holy Scriptures without having someone to go before you and show you the road. . . . The science of the Scriptures is the only one which all persons indiscriminately claim as their own. This science the babbling old woman, the doting old man, the wordy sophist, take upon themselves; they tear it to tatters and teach before they themselves have learned . . . they fancy that what they utter is the law of God.[3]

What was true in the fifth century is abundantly true in the twentieth. The distinction between eras would seem to lie in the area of the strongest criticism. Today the scripturists are attacked more frequently because they have either been misunderstood or have failed to transmit lucidly the mind of the sacred writers. Their readers have feared a creeping fabianism which would destroy the most solemn concepts and leave the Bible an empty, dull book replete with enigmas and topics for doctoral dissertations. In justice to the scripturists it must be affirmed that technical works do not always find a kindly welcome when there is a departure from cherished positions or an understanding when readers are unable to comprehend the argument. On the other hand it must be asserted that not all that is new is true and in recent times too many conclusions have been drawn in advance of evidence. The troubles are not one sided. It appears to the writer that troubles common to both are presently found in comprehending and explaining matters of inerrancy, literary forms and historicity. Let us take a second look at these three fields.

[2] From the *Life Thoughts* of Henry Ward Beecher.
[3] *Ep.* 53 Ad Paulinum, *MPL, 22*: 544.

INERRANCY

Inerrancy has been described as The Scriptural Question. All problems are directly or indirectly related to it. Despite its centrality, it is probably the most difficult and most delicate area of study. Its solutions are hard to come by inasmuch as they require a pooling of knowledge and a discernment that might be termed expert. The question will demand of the Church and the ecclesiastical sciences centuries of work, not in supplying a basic principle, but rather in applying a basic principle to concrete cases. The fundamental principle of inerrancy is that the sacred books were written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and hence cannot contain error. This fact is abundantly clear from the writing of the fathers and ecclesiastical documents. One needs but page the papal pronouncements since Pope Leo XIII, *Providentissimus Deus, Pascendi, Spiritus Paraclitus, Divino Afflante Spiritu,* and the replies of the Pontifical Biblical Commission to recognize the unanimity of doctrine. A Catholic must reject all theories which would teach openly or covertly that error in some way can exist in the sacred text as it came from the hand of the sacred author. The same must be asserted for translations to the extent to which they represent the autograph. St. Augustine affirms this truth with his usual clarity:

> I have learned to pay them such honor and respect as to believe most firmly that not one of their authors has erred in writing anything at all. If I do find anything in those books which seems contrary to truth, I decide that either the text is corrupt, or the translator did not follow what was really said, or that I failed to understand it.[4]

If error seems to be found in the text as we possess it, we must not presume the text wrong. We must prove that it is wrong and then take the prudent steps to emend it. The presumption lies in favor of the text and must not be dismissed by hasty or arbitrary judgments. It is of prime importance that the scripturist work with a critical text. This point is often overlooked by those who recognize in new translations departures from what they have customarily read. New translations are often the products of textual criticism. At the turn of the century this discipline was used in an arbitrary and often cavalier fashion by those intent on super-

[4] *Ep.* 82 Ad Hier., *MPL,* 33: 277.

imposing their own biblical theology on the sacred text. True criticism has been necessary to produce a text free from corruptions due to the carelessness of copyists and the errors which time has allowed to creep into the sacred writings. Imperfections have arisen due to dittography, haplography, the influence of context, similar sounds at the beginning or end of words, confusion of letters and sounds, transmutations of letters, false divisions of words and the introduction of marginal material. For their constant work in this field modern Catholic scripturists have received the encouragement of the late pontiff who considered textural criticism:

> not only necessary for the right understanding of the divinely given writings, but also is urgently demanded by that very piety by which it behooves us to be grateful to the God of all providence Who from the throne of His majesty has sent these books as so many paternal letters to His own children.[5]

In this area the scripturists have made us their debtors. Perhaps we might add our patience to our gratitude and give them the encouragement they deserve. One must draw his conclusions from a critical text supplied him. He then employs the rules of logical thought, the principles of literary interpretation, the analogy of faith and the teachings of the Church as his guides. When difficulties arise he should keep in mind the following general principles:

(1) Sacred Scripture, although the word of God, is the word of God expressed in human language. Any expression accepted among men as correct is possible in Sacred Scripture. Any expression deemed as erroneous in an uninspired writing must not be treated differently in Sacred Scripture.

(2) Only that which is guaranteed by the human author is guaranteed by God, the principal author. When the sacred writer approximates or estimates numbers, times, places and the canons of style, his statements with their restrictions fall within the scope of inspiration.

(3) The personal assertions of the sacred writer fall within the ambit of inspiration to the extent intended by them. (An example of this principle is the Matthean genealogy in which the author does not intend to provide anything more than an artificial list.)

[5] *Divino Afflante Spiritu*, par. 19.

(4) It is possible for different persons to give different accounts of the same event witnessed by them. Each writer has his own point of view, his own background against which to write, his own special interest and his own literary education or lack of it.

If we were to summarize these principles we might affirm that God teaches what the inspired author teaches and what the inspired author affirms God affirms. It might be objected that not every line of Sacred Scripture contains a teaching or an affirmation of fact. The objection is valid, for the human processes of thought range from an admission of ignorance to an assertion of certitude. Various states of mind wander through any given writing and it is impossible under ordinary circumstances to determine that an author has rendered his thought apodictically. Any author accepts ready made concepts which have travelled through time in the oral or written remarks of countless others. He necessarily suffers not only a limitation of thought but also a certain imperfection of expression which appears more evident when others using the same ideas clothe them in more perfect language. Imperfect notions and less than perfect expressions are not to be construed as erroneous when the author does not affirm them *ex professo*. The sacred author uses the thoughts and expressions which God wants him to use and thus his work is inspired and inerrant despite what some term its literary inadequacy. Thus it would not appear too surprising to apply to the Scriptures the words of Byron in Don Juan:

But words are things, and a small drop of ink
Falling like dew upon a thought, produces
That which makes thousands, perhaps millions think.

LITERARY FORMS

Today's second major problem is not merely one of semantics or the highly developed science of meanings. It is also the question of the recognition of literary forms or the patterns of writing employed in a given literary milieu of a particular religious or social epoch. The literary form is the vehicle of expression used to carry the message of a book, parts of a book and an isolated pericope. It is selected by the author to express the things he wants to express in precisely the way he desires to express them. Each literary form has a species of truth proper to it and must be

considered closely to determine the author's purpose in employing it. Truth can be written in many ways. The form does not derogate from the truth involved simply because its vehicle differs from place to place. The creation account in Genesis asserts a creator with the same force despite its semitic form as does the thirteenth chapter of Wisdom with its somewhat Greek form. The styles and form differ in both, but the truth remains the same.

The biblical writers had a multiplicity of forms available to them. Perhaps the most evident are found in the didactic books of the Old Testament. While all seven books have as their common aim the teaching of ethical principles nonetheless the form changes. One can note the poet's relationship to subject matter and the natural division of material into lyric poetry, where he seems to speak for himself, and into dramatic poetry when he ascribes words and actions to his characters. Themes can be described along the same lines for they seem to be categorized as reflective lyrics, didactic lyrics or simple songs. The literary framework of Job is a very evident one. It was arranged as a dramatic dialogue whose characters are led on and off the stage by a writer who parades a list of concepts on the nature and purpose of suffering. The Psalms are devotional lyrics or hymns. The Book of Proverbs is a compilation of trenchant, homely maxims clothed in beautiful didactic lyrics. Ecclesiastes is a solemn monologue or a reflective lyric with an attempt at literary impersonation. The Canticle of Canticles is a nuptial hymn which assumes the form of a dialogue of lovers interspersed with choral parts. The Book of Wisdom is a reflective lyric containing a Jewish theology of history couched in the subtle expressions of the Greek. Ecclesiasticus is a didactic lyric more extensive and more intricate than Proverbs. This attachment to the poetic form finds its way into the prophetical books and becomes quite evident in the Hebrew text in which the structure is not lost in translation. Osee and Amos are in verse. Jeremias and Ezechiel are chiefly in prose. Isaias, the finest piece of Hebrew literature, is more than half versified. Simple narration is found in the historical books. A fable is found in *Ju.* 9:8-15; allegories in *Is.* 5:1-6; *Ez.* 16; 23; *Jn.* 15:1-6; and parables throughout the synoptics. Needless to say, each has its form of truth either objectively or in its manner of application. It is one thing to affirm the existence of the prodigal son and quite another to affirm the existence of

Mary Magdalen. In the former case the sacred author relates a parable told by Our Lord. The prodigal son need never have existed except in the mind of Christ, but his story is told in parabolic form to teach the truth of divine forgiveness. In the latter case the evangelist records a flesh and blood example of a prodigal daughter and teaches the same divine truth. As time progresses the recognition of literary forms will be made with greater precision and the effect will be the better understanding of the sacred text.

HISTORICITY

The third area of major problems is that of historicity. The poetical, the parabolic and the allegoric present little difficulty compared to that of prose narration. It is in this area that the dictum attributed to St. Jerome becomes most apposite: "Commentatoris officium esse, non quid ipse velit, sed quid sentiat ille quem interpretetur exponere." The "quid ipse velit" of some moderns has obscured in whole or in part the "ille quem interpretetur exponere." This is nowhere more true than in those narratives which have the form of history. There is little argument over the distinctions between poetry and prose. The differences are too obvious to expound. The difficulty arises with the question of the historical form of certain narratives. All authors whether they be labeled ancient or modern, liberal or conservative have come face to face with the problem and have brought with them their own particular principle or principles of interpretation. All have recognized that historical forms exist, but not all are as careful in making distinctions in this area as they are in the didactic books. It is absolutely necessary that distinctions be made with ultimate care because of the serious consequences flowing from them. There is a great distinction between saying that the prodigal son did not actually exist and in saying that Mary Magdalen did not exist. One might object to the presence of Pontius Pilate in the Creed on the assumption that it is undignified, but his insertion is an attestation of a truth.

Abstracting from biblical history for the moment and turning briefly to profane history, we can recognize a number of historical literary forms distinguishable in their accuracy and in the literary freeness of their portrayal. Some narratives relate deeds as they happened and are classified as chronicles. These same deeds have

an interpretation placed upon them and are classed as history strictly so called. Another type of narrative treats the same material with greater literary liberty, amplifying, adorning and edifying as the tale unfolds. A fourth class compiles popular traditions having a kernel of truth encrusted with layers of hyperbole and legend. A fifth species is that of the myth with no foundation in fact and no mark of distinction except that of being well imagined. Since the advent of Modernism attempts have been made to relate the types described above to the sacred text. The philosophical motives which stirred the protagonists of the movement were basically those of the positivists who accepted only what they could measure in a concrete way. There was also an evident desire not only among the anti-biblicists, but also among those caught in their fog, to avoid the consequences of accepting an historical Christ and a divinely established Church. Thus came into existence the specious distinction between the Christ of history and the Christ of faith. While the *Lamentabili* and the *Pascendi* cleared the air of virus of Modernism, its after-effects have lingered. Unless those who treat certain historical topics in the New Testament make the proper distinctions clearly and forcefully, they will run the risk of falling into a modernist trap or taking to their theological beds like typhoid Marys. One has the impression that more harm is being done by the imprudent, the half-trained and the untrained in this area that in any area of the theological sciences. Many who are utterly incapable of assessing the facts have pontificated with a remarkable degree of self-confidence detrimental to themselves and to those who come under their influence. In the seminary classroom where the seminarians are grounded in Fundamental Dogma, or in graduate school where the students are presumed to have seen the field of sacred theology at least panoramically, the exposure to such material is not only prudent but necessary. Exposure in the public forum except apologetically can be downright disastrous. No one expects, much less demands, expert treatment of such highly delicate questions. Fast, flippant answers are too often the substitute for depth of thought and simplicity of expression. One need not be afraid of the new but he should beware of oversimplification, understatement and inaccuracy solemnized by slogan. He should also be careful regarding indirections, intimations, implications and the inferences of those who fear to admit their conclu-

sions frankly and who cover themselves by the use of a specious dubiety. If a scriptural question is in the dark night of its winter, there is absolutely no reason for looking for swallows. If perchance a stray swallow be found, one should not announce the first day of spring.

Scriptural solutions like nature itself need time to bud, blossom and bear fruit. In the current discussion regarding the infancy narratives, the presentation in some discussions leaves something to be desired. Rather than deny the existence of the star which attracted the Magi by simply pointing to the blossoming of a fictitious rose in a midrashic account of the visit of the Queen of Sheba to Solomon, one would be more in line with honesty to admit a similarity and affirm that God is the God of nature and controls the creatures of his Hand. Rather than deny the flight into Egypt by the Holy Family and point to the hiding of the baby Moses in the bullrushes, one would be more in line with honesty to state that both were marked for death. We affirm this not because we fail to observe the similarities where biblical narratives are drawn with parallel lines, but because the only artificialities in the infancy narratives appear in the selection of the events described.

Here again we assert that the artificiality of form does not derogate from the historical reality involved. The divine prediction of the birth of a child, the incidents surrounding his birth, the dangers to which the child was exposed, the giving of a name significative of his office or function in life, the completion of the work given him to accomplish and his subsequent death in friendship with the creator are a common literary framework for the biographies of the servants of God. When the same framework is used to relate the story of the God-man one need not be surprised. It was the most natural medium at the disposal of men steeped in a biblical tradition and the most apposite literary form for a provident Holy Spirit to use as a vehicle of inspiration. The wonder is not that the Holy Spirit used it, but that one would wonder that he should have used it at all. Let those who fear that modern scriptural studies are tearing the Bible to tatters be assured that there was an annunciation, a nativity, a visit by the Magi, a flight into Egypt and a return to Nazareth just as surely as there was a wedding feast in Cana, a multiplication of the loaves and fishes and a sacrifice on Calvary. The fruit of the present work on

the infancy narratives will bear fruit in demonstrating the wonderful providence of God. It is unfortunate that its elements were too quickly seized upon and conclusions drawn which were not found in its evidence.

At this point it might serve a purpose to review briefly the celebrated question of the "narrationes specietenus tantum historicae." At the turn of the century Von Hummelauer attempting to counteract the moves of the modernists drew up his famous eight categories of history and applied them to the Bible. Shortly afterward the following question was directed toward the Pontifical Biblical Commission:

> Utrum admitti possit tamquam principium rectae exegeseos sententia quae tenet S. Scripturae libros qui pro historia habentur, sive totaliter, sive ex parte, non historiam proprie dictam et objective veram quandoque narrare, sed speciem tantum historiae prae se ferre ad aliquid significandum a proprie litterali seu historica verborum significatione alienum?

The following response was given in 1905:

> Negative, excepto tamen casu, non facile nec temere admittendo, in quo, Ecclesiae sensu non refragante eiusque salvo iudicio, solidis argumentis probetur Hagiographum voluisse non veram et proprie dictam historiam tradere, sed sub specie et forma historiae parabolam, allegoriam, vel sensum aliquem a proprie litterali seu historica verborum significatione remotum proponere.[6]

Evidently, if an author adopting historical form can be shown not to intend to compose actual history, then he must be interpreted in a different light. He must be allowed a certain freedom in the presentation of his material. This is precisely what Von Hummelauer, Lagrange, Prat and other Catholic writers had in mind when the question was proposed. They did not want to undermine the historical notions which had been presented prior to their day, but they did desire to demonstrate the possibility of forms other than that of strict history. The decree makes it clear that the principle is admissible but it circumscribes it with the proper restrictions. Thus one cannot accept the principle as a general guiding norm for historical passages without qualification. The pre-

[6] *Enchiridion Biblicum*, n. 154.

sumption therefore is in favor of the historical character of historical books. The author must be presumed to have intended to write facts as facts. The exception rests in establishing the conditions related. Obviously, when the tradition of the Church has not settled the question, the individual scholar does not presume to do so. The door of his argument must remain open for further discussion.

The Commission did not delineate the notion of solid arguments any more than it outlined the segments of Sacred Writ which would fall within the compass of the decree. The difficulties of such a process are evident. The narratives of the Unjust Steward, *Lk.* 16:1-8, the Prodigal Son, *Lk.* 15:11-32, the Unmerciful Servant, *Mt.* 18:23-35, and Dives and Lazarus, *Lk.* 16:19-31 are not described as parables. Few would be reluctant to deny that they are parables, yet there is no explicit mention of their literary nature in the text. The celebrated story of the Good Samaritan is a parable, yet it is developed as an historical event. *Lk.* 10:30-37. The transition in that pericope is from a real question to an answer illustrated by a case which could have been taken from real life. One does not have to amass evidence that the sacred author did not want to write strict history. The problem, if any was involved, lay in the selection of an illustration by Christ. One may not claim the same measure of freedom regarding the intentions of the authors of the books of Tobias and Esther. In these cases commentators are obliged to offer serious, solid, prudent, scholarly proofs sufficiently strong to establish a reasonable conviction that the sacred authors did not intend to compose strict history. Naturally not all their readers will be convinced because of diversity of judgment and thus a conclusion will be as solid as its evidence. Scholarly challenge and time itself will be its acid test.

In this area moderation is absolutely necessary. The conservative as well as the liberal must practice it. Neither is led by false irenics when he studies the Sacred Scriptures in search of truth. One should not consider the other a destroyer of cherished positions until he understands what the proper position is or should be. The other should not suggest that his opponent has his eyes closed to the gathering of new truth. Both should be presumed to assume a posture in defense of truth even though they might be doing so in different ways. The storm brewed by the discussions of the

infancy narratives would never have amounted to more than a gentle breeze had the parties involved been less belligerent and more tolerant. Scholarship develops when parties are heard and arguments assessed in a spirit of concord.

We noted in the opening paragraph that the Bible has often been treated too fragmentally. Once a truth has been attacked and reduced to rubble in the mind of a reader all truth is in serious danger. The same is true of what is apparently true. If something is shown to be untrue and if it be accepted by a reader as a lie, and if the distinctions that should be made are not made, then the observation of St. Augustine becomes most pertinent:

> I think that it is extremely dangerous to admit that anything in the Sacred Books should be a lie; that is, that the men who have composed and written the Scriptures for us should have lied in their books. It is quite another question whether a good man should ever lie, and still another whether a writer of the Holy Scriptures ought to lie, but no, that is not another question: it is no question at all. If we once admit in that supreme authority even one polite lie, there will be nothing left of those books, because, whenever anyone finds something difficult to practice or hard to believe, he will follow this most dangerous precedent and explain it as the idea or practice of a lying author.[7]

Modern Western man is in danger of this catastrophe when he approaches the Bible without the proper balance. People who have been accustomed to the rigid logic of Aristotelianism will be troubled by the semitic obscurity of the sacred text. If they be specialists in the field of the speculative, they disregard the fact that the Jews were never given to abstractions, but were very much down to earth. If they be philologists, they view every break in literary smoothness as evidence of a tampered text. If they be historians, they catalogue all historical themes and get lost hunting for lost sources. If perchance they be simple critics, they look for arguments for the sake of arguments and retreat from the scriptures in a state of complete confusion. The trouble lies not in the Bible considered merely as literature for every written work labors under the difficulty of communicating ideas in language that is immediately comprehensible. The sacred authors are not designedly obscure like the writers of the Eleusinian mysteries. They simply

[7] *Ep.* 28 Ad Hier., *MPL*, 33, 112 f.

used a dialetic different than our own. They leaned heavily upon the poetic and the affective while the westerner depends upon the prosaic and the real. The semites became the early day bards of the spirit while the westerner became the latter day reporter. The former enjoyed more latitude within which he could exercise his thoughts, while the latter restricted himself within the confines of his concepts which tend to be demonstrable. The Jew never proved the existence of God, but he thought a man a fool who said in his heart that there is no God. The Graeco-Roman demonstrated His existence with the ironclad logic of the syllogism and thought a man illogical if he did not acknowledge Him. Perhaps there is a gram of truth in the assertion that the Jew loved God so much he often did not reverence Him properly, and the Gentile reverenced Him so much that he often did not love Him sufficiently. These observations are couched in generalities. One needs to be reminded that frequently the exception proves the rule. Yet when a man opens the Bible he might do well to keep these thoughts in mind for he reads some of himself into every page. Whether he be Jew or Greek, bondman or free, he has become the heir of the thoughts of God that he "may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God . . . and have life in His name."[8]

It behooves those who handle the word of God to handle it with care. *Sancta sancte tractanda.* It behooves those who teach to remember the capacities of their students. Some students are blind beggars at the doors of a temple of learning and hear the words "what I do not have I give thee." Others are like the Ethiopian awaiting a Philip to open up the scriptures for them. Still more are like excited Rhodas forgetful of what they see and frightened by what they do not see. All are looking for the truth. Unless it be given to them clearly, forcefully and according to the certain knowledge available to them, it can prove a scandal to them. Improper treatment can become a stumbling block and foolishness in a Pauline paraphrase. To those who have the Scriptures explained properly it has become the power of God and the wisdom of God. It behooves the writers of scriptural articles to remember that the Bible is the most glorious book in the world. Coming to it through their commentaries ought to be much like

[8] *John*, 20: 31.

looking through a clear picture window at a landscape upon which the sun of divine providence has generously cast its radiant beams.

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FIFTY YEARS AGO

The July, 1911, issue of *The American Ecclesiastical Review* opens with a full-page, colored representation of the coat-of-arms of Cardinal Gibbons, in honor of his fiftieth anniversary as a priest and his twenty-fifth anniversay as a cardinal. Mr. Pierre de Chaignon la Rose, who designed this work of heraldry, explains it, and also the arms of several other members of the American hierarchy. . . . Fr. Francis P. Donnelly, S.J., writes on "The Science of Theology and the Art of Sacred Eloquence." His chief theme is that a preacher should adapt his theological knowledge to the capacity of the congregation—for example, by avoiding too many technical terms. . . . Mr. G. Metlake, writing from Germany, contributes the first of a series of articles on Bishop von Ketteler, the nineteenth century prelate who worked so zealously for labor reforms. . . . Fr. J. B. Ceulemans summarizes the various non-Catholic philosophical systems current in America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, showing how they began on a religious basis and gradually declined into unbelief, chiefly through the influence of Thomas Paine's *Age of Reason*. . . . Fr. B. Feeney, of St. Paul, writing on "Discipline in the Seminary," insists especially on the necessity of training seminarians in trustworthiness. . . . Fr. A. Maas, S.J., under the heading "Recent Christ Problems," discusses the place of Our Lord's birth, in view of a recent opinion that He was born in Nazareth, not in Bethlehem, and was an Aryan, not a Jew. . . . This issue contains three articles on sterilization, two of which favor the opinion that compulsory vasectomy to prevent defective offspring is lawful, while the third article, by Fr. Schmitt, S.J., declares it unlawful (the only opinion that can be held today, in view of the clear declaration of Pope Pius XI). . . . A correspondent praises the "Mystery Beads," a form of rosary which has medals for the Our Father beads, engraved with pictures of the mysteries. The writer asserts, however, that they cost too much. . . . The first volume of the dogmatic series by Dr. J. Pohle, translated by A. Preuss, receives a well deserved tribute in the Book Review section.

F.J.C.

MODERNISM AND THE TEACHING OF SCHLEIERMACHER

II

In his later writings, Schleiermacher built upon the philosophical positions discussed in the first part of this article.[1] His application of these teachings to Christianity appears with greater clarity in his chief dogmatic work, *The Christian Faith (Der christliche Glaube)*. It is a *Dogmatik,* covering the entire field of doctrine to which Protestant theology can point. It has something of the appearance of a theological manual, being frequently a commentary on sections of the Augsburg Confession and other such doctrinal statements.

The entire work is pervaded by Schleiermacher's own approach to religion and thus almost everything receives a somewhat new interpretation. There is a special emphasis upon the *community,* on the social concept of the Christian Church (as understood, of course, by Schleiermacher). Hence, Schleiermacher notes at the start that "a Church is nothing but a communion or association relating to religion or piety."[2] The piety of such a communion may seek expression in various manners, but there is always a basic and common element present, i.e. the self-identical *essence* of piety which is "the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God."[3]

This Christian feeling, which represents the highest activity of the Holy Spirit in man is, for Schleiermacher, the source of the Christian religion. As such, it also represents for him the highest grade of human self-consciousness.[4] It is this common Christian consciousness that leads necessarily to living fellowship or communion: to a Church.[5]

We can note in this the fact that it is the piety or religious feeling which forms the Church, and not the opposite. In Schleiermacher's

[1] Cf. *AER,* CXLIV (1961), 377 ff.

[2] Friedrich Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith,* trans, by H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928), p. 5 (No. 3, 1).

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 12 (No. 4).

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 18 (No. 5).

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 26 (No. 6).

system, the Church is not accepted as a teacher, speaking on the authority of God. Religion knows one basic contact with God, and that is within the depths of the individual being. This experience or feeling (*das Gefühl*) is the essence of all religion, even of Christianity. In assuming this position, Schleiermacher separates himself not only from Catholic doctrine but from the theological position of sixteenth and seventeenth century Protestantism as well. Though his words may sound the same, everything in his theological system takes on a new meaning since everything is colored by this completely different approach.

Borrowing from those propositions formulated earlier in his general philosophy of religion, Schleiermacher goes on to discuss the diversities of religious communions in general. His solution to this problem is unique. He does not consider the division of religions an indication of break with authority or failure to perceive God's objective revelation; he rejects *no* religion and is careful to point out that all religious communions—from idol worship and polythism, on the lower plane, to monotheism on the higher—reflect this basic feeling of absolute dependence. For this reason they are all perfectly acceptable. He does grant, however, that there is a hierarchy among these various beliefs, since some represent a more profound and intimate experience of the divine; monotheism is the highest plane of all, and history exhibits only three great monotheistic communions: the Jewish, the Christian, and the Mohammedan.[6]

In this we can note Schleiermacher's evolutionary concerns. The religious experience of mankind has undergone a purifying process through the centuries. Thus in his opinion both the Jewish and the Mohammedan form of monotheistic belief involve obvious imperfections:

> Judaism, by its limitation of the love of Jehovah to the race of Abraham, betrays a lingering affinity with Fetichism; and the numerous vacillations towards idol-worship prove that during the political heyday of the nation the monotheistic faith had not yet taken fast root, and was not fully and purely developed until after the Babylonian Exile. Islam, on the other hand, with its passionate character, and the strongly sensuous content of its ideas, betrays, in spite of its strict Monotheism,

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 37 (No. 8, 4).

a large measure of that influence of the sensible upon the character of the religious emotions which elsewhere keeps men on the level of Polytheism.[7]

Christianity alone among the Monotheistic communions "remains free from both these weaknesses," and therefore it "stands higher than either of those other two forms, and takes its place as the purest form of Monotheism which has appeared in history."[8] On the basis of this comparison of Christianity with other similar religions, Schleiermacher concludes that "Christianity is, in fact, the most perfect of the most highly developed forms of religion."[9]

This line of argumentation brings out more clearly than any others the close relationship between the philosophy and the theology of Schleiermacher. While he does not reduce Christianity to a purely natural instinct or to mere philosophy, there is nevertheless an element within it that is common to all religious experience and to all forms of religion. Christianity is distinguished from all other faiths simply "by the fact that in it everything is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth."[10] The root of this corporate union is faith in Christ the Redeemer; apart from that, Schleiermacher insists, there can be no participation in the *Christian* communion.[11]

In Schleiermacher's approach to Christianity, we can also perceive the element of religious Indifferentism. As his basic principle, he holds that "the only pertinent way of discovering the peculiar essence of any particular faith and reducing it as far as possible to a formula is by showing the element which remains *constant* throughout the most diverse religious affections within this same communion, while it is absent from analogous affections within other communions."[12] Religious differences within the sects must, in other words, be boiled down to a common denominator. This search for the essential of a particular form of religious belief encounters unique problems in regard to Christianity, according to Schleiermacher:

[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 52 (No. 11).
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 68 (No. 14).
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 52 (No. 11, 1). Italics ours.

Christianity presents special difficulties, even in this fact alone, that it takes a greater variety of form than other faiths and is split up into a multiplicity of smaller communions or churches; and thus there arises a twofold task, first, to find the peculiar essence, common to all these communions, of Christianity as such, and secondly, to find the peculiar essence of the particular communion whose right is to be authenticated or whose system of doctrine is to be established.[13]

For Schleiermacher, the secondary elements of belief contained within the Creeds of the various Christian sects must be looked upon as non-essential; the core remains the common and all pervading notion of redemption through Christ. Any Christian religion, therefore, which adheres to this essential concept is to be accepted as truly Christian, despite further differences on other matters of doctrine. Such a religious experience is truly Christian, and thus distinct from all other forms of Monotheistic belief, provided it is rooted in this notion of Christ the Redeemer.

Apart from this essential core, when Schleiermacher comes to discuss the essence of Christian dogma, he follows this same general pattern: the essence of religion is that inner, personal experience, Creeds and dogmas can be nothing but an outward expression of this personal experience; churches are formed by the association of those who have shared a similar experience.

RADICAL DEPARTURE

It is in these further applications of his basic position that we can perceive even more clearly the far-flung effects of Schleiermacher's theorizing, and the result of his philosophical starting-points. It is in these applications, moreover, that the Catholic theologian recognizes the philosophico-theological relativism imbedded in his overall approach.

"Christian *doctrines,*" according to Schleiermacher, "are accounts of the Christian *religious affections* set forth in speech."[14] The root of doctrinal statement in credal or dogmatic form is, always was and always must be, nothing more than these "religious affections." These lead the way and determine the belief of the Christian community at any given time.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 53.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 76 (No. 15). Italics ours.

As Flückiger notes, it is rather astounding that Schleiermacher failed to realize the vast difference between his approach and the position of the sixteenth century Reformers. In this, Schleiermacher was undoubtedly a product of his own age and philosophical development, and presupposed that his dogmatic views were a significant and logical outgrowth of the Reformation principles. His grasp of the historical truth must have been deficient, for in actual fact Schleiermacher transferred the center of religious experience to a completely different point, as Flückiger indicates:

> The Church, as he presents it, does not live by the Word of God, as subject to its sovereignty, but entirely and without reservation from its own revealing power. Its own Christian, devout self-consciousness is itself the divine "Word" which it proclaims, and at any given time it possesses, in that present state of development of this consciousness, the highest expression of Christian truth then available.[15]

In adopting this approach, Schleiermacher necessarily abandoned the Reformation attempt to formulate Creeds or Confessions as *norms* of belief. For him this was equivalent to stopping the wheels of historical progression within religion, and latching on to former stages of doctrinal development, freezing them for future use, as it were, when actually they ought to retain their fluid state and give way to new expressions of faith and new Creeds more fittingly adapted to the religious experience of the present moment.

Since Schleiermacher was writing a *Dogmatik,* this view of religious Creeds naturally raised a further question: What is the role of the dogmatic theologian within the Church? He himself was writing a theological work, and had to justify that task somehow. His answer is that to dogmatic theologians must be assigned the task of "describing" more than anything else: "Dogmatic Theology is the science which systematizes the doctrine prevalent in a Christian Church at a given time."[16] Thus the task of theology is never ended. As new religious experiences replace old ones, new doctrines will replace old ones in similar fashion; and the dogmatic theologian must look upon it as his essential task to set forth the doctrines prevalent during his lifetime rather than those taught a century ago, a thousand years ago, or in the era of primitive and

[15] Felix Flückiger, *Philosophie und Theologie bie Schleiermacher* (Zollikon-Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1947), p. 128.

[16] Schleiermacher, *op. cit.*, p. 88 (No. 19).

apostolic Christianity. All of these former beliefs pertain to history rather than a living belief, and the theologian betrays his particular vocation if he attempts to present these records of the past as norms for current belief.

This approach has many ramifications. It means ultimately that any such *Dogmatik,* just as the Confessions and the doctrines which it describes, can be valid only for a time; it cannot be looked upon as a universal and unchanging statement of Christian belief. Schleiermacher recognizes that such a position is not to be found in the writings of most theologians, but this fails to perplex him; he feels that others have simply taken it for granted:

> That each [dogmatic] presentation confines itself to the doctrine existing at a certain time, is indeed seldom expressly avowed, but it nevertheless seems to be a matter of course; and this seems, for the most part, to be the only possible explanation of the large number of dogmatic presentations which follow upon each other. It is obvious that the text-books of the seventeenth century can no longer serve the same purpose as they did then, but now in large measure belong merely to the realm of historical presentation; and that in the present day it is only a different set of dogmatic presentations that can have the ecclesiastical value which these had then; and the same fate will one day befall the present ones too.[17]

Schleiermacher admits the vast difference between Protestant and Catholic Creeds; for him, each of these represent the religious experience of the individual communities so that "a presentation suitable for Protestantism cannot possibly be suitable for Catholics, there being no systematic connexion between the doctrines of the one and those of the other."[18] Because of this, Schleiermacher could not be accused of wishing to fuse various beliefs in the interests of ecumenism; his system left no place for such effort and he notes accordingly that "a dogmatic presentation which aimed at avoiding contradiction from either of these two parties would lack ecclesiastical value for both in almost every proposition."[19]

From Schleiermacher's point of view, the inner religious *life* of each separate community was its sole guide, but this guide had to be followed. Apart from this there can be no personal conviction;

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 89 (No. 19, 2).
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ibid.*

the individual must enter into a convinced presentation of his own particular belief. Thus "a dogmatic presentation which takes no sides but is purely historical will always be sufficiently distinct from a presentation which is also apologetic—the only kind now in view."[20]

This reworking of dogmatic presentations is not to be understood as something which touches merely the manner of presentation—a work of revision in regard to style, as it were, or a new ordering of dogmatic textbooks in line with further insights into the meaning of the old doctrine. In the teaching of Schleiermacher, the changes are far more radical; they involve changes in *doctrine itself,* based upon the changes in the manner in which the Christians grasp and understand revelation. At any given time, the Church will understand revelation only partially and imperfectly, he insists; hence there is ever-present a necessary work of perfecting and correcting. This does not imply, for Schleiermacher, either a homogeneous development of doctrine, to use Marin-Sola's phrase, or a doctrine of pure subjectivism; he is most careful to insist on some kind of objective reality, the result of the working of the Holy Spirit. The various Churches do not *create* doctrine and Creeds by dint of their own reasoning powers; they are always "receiving" this from the Spirit in this profound Christian experience. Only then can they formulate this experience in Confessions and Creeds, and describe it in dogmatic presentations. But it may always be an essentially different doctrine that is so received.

ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY

The influence of the Spirit is generally observed more clearly in the whole Christian community than in only one individual. Schleiermacher stresses quite strongly the social element in belief and the role of the Christian community in recognizing a true religious experience. Without some stamp of approval given by the Church, we have only personal opinions:

> In the first place, everyone will admit that a system, however coherent, of purely and entirely individual opinions and views, which, even if really Christian, did not link themselves at all to the expressions used in the Church for the communication of religion, would always

[20] *Ibid.,* p. 89 (No. 19, 1).

be regarded as simply a private confession and not as dogmatic presentation, until there came to be attached to it a likeminded society, and there thus arose a public preaching and communication of religion which found its norm in that doctrine.[21]

Thus the concept of religious belief as it appears in *The Christian Faith* must be understood in relationship to Schleiermacher's notion of what the Christian Church itself really is. Obviously, he does not require any definite and essential organizational aspect for a "Church." He points out that "according to Christ's original intention there was not to be any such visible Church. . . ."[22] It is only the Invisible Church that is the true, perfect, undivided and infallible Church. The *Visible* Church is but a faint reflection of this; it is, accordingly, something divided, imperfect, subject to error and ever changing. The outward expression of belief on the part of the Visible Church implies these very imperfections. The doctrinal expression of the prevailing "Christian feeling" represents truth for the moment, but it is never the total and accurate account of the faith of the Invisible Church:

> When this innermost consciousness comes to be particularized in definite ideas, it no longer has the same full truth. . . . Hence the outward expression of the inner truth becomes more or less distorted, and of its organized form the Spirit takes possession only gradually.[23]

Out of this basic approach there necessarily arises a universal truth that lies in the center of Schleiermacher's thought: namely, the relativity of all externalized formulas of belief. This relativity is extended not only to the earlier Confessions of sixteenth century Protestantism, but to all the ancient Creeds as well. The Nicean Creed is essentially no different, in this system, from the Augsburg Confession: they both represent valid, but temporary and imperfect formulations of faith corresponding to the particular religious feeling of the Christian communities in each era. All Creeds known to history represent the "prevalent doctrine" of the Christian community at the time and in the circumstances in which they were composed, but they must not be looked upon as irreformable statements of belief for all time. They are only partial and imperfect expressions of Christian truth:

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 90 (No. 19, 3).
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 677 (No. 148, 2).
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 678 (No. 149, 1).

No definition of doctrine, then, even when arrived at with the most perfect community of feeling, can be regarded as irreformable and valid for all time. This is pre-eminently true of definitions which arose after controversy as presentations put forth by a larger or smaller majority, for controversy more than anything else rouses all those impulses that lead to error. Hence no one can be bound to acknowledge the contents of such presentations as Christian truth except in so far as they are the expressions of his own religious consciousness, or commend themselves to him by their scriptural character.[24]

There is, accordingly, a never-ending task of revision of the Church's public doctrine to which everyone, according to his own ability, must contribute. In this lies the second task proper to the theologian. Like all others he may—through his speculations—contribute to the progressive understanding of revealed truth. His own individuality may "have an influence upon the form and manner of treatment, and even assert itself at particular points by intentional correction of the usual position."[25] The ultimate norm for the prevalent doctrine, however, remains the Christian community which either accepts or rejects any insights proposed. Schleiermacher insists that there is room for controversy, debates, analyses within the Church, but generally such "improvements and new developments of Christian doctrine . . . hardly ever proceed directly from the dogmatic discussions themselves, but are for the most part occasioned, in one way or another, by the proceedings of public worship or by popular literature for the dissemination of religion."[26] In this entire process, as he notes elsewhere, there runs a natural agreement concerning the basic principles by which error is to be counteracted, but even in regard to these, "this agreement is a thing of gradual formation in each Church, and can only arise when the Church has come to self-consciousness."[27]

Following this basic approach, Schleiermacher proceeds to praise the sixteenth century Reformers for their refusal to submit to the decisions of a General Council; only the Christian community could solve the controversies of that era. At the same time, he criticizes these Reformers for accepting the Creeds of the ancient Church. In doing this, they were most inconsistent "for these

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 690 (No. 154, 2).
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 90 (No. 19, 3).
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 690 (No. 154, 2).

Creeds are but the product of similar Councils, which besides were due to divisions within the Church, and hence were not pre-eminently fitted for the ascertainment of truth."[28]

In this fashion, Schleiermacher rejects not only all Creeds, but all Councils; there is no room for an authoritative teaching body in this notion of the Church. For this reason he finds another inconsistency in the actions of sixteenth and seventeenth century Protestants. They eventually came to formulate various Protestant Creeds, such as the Augsburg Confession or the Westminster Confession, and made the acceptance of these a requisite for membership in Protestant Churches. Schleiermacher grants that under the historical circumstances in which the Reformers found themselves it was only natural and good that they should have set forth the "prevalent doctrine" (that is, the convictions they then held) by means of these Confessions. He considers it a grave mistake, however, and a matter of deep regret, that these same Confessions were later imposed in authoritarian fashion as the *norm* of Protestant belief "as if they had been irreformable."[29]

In Schleiermacher's system, all such practices were an attempt to freeze the expression of religious experience at one stage of its development. He feels that neither the ancient Councils (such as Nicea or Chalcedon) nor the Protestant Confessions had the right to do that. None of them have anything more than temporary value. Each generation has the right to express in its own formulas the religious experience that is proper to it, but any attempt to permanentize particular Confessions will simply "hinder the performance of the very task to which [these Creeds] owed their birth."[30]

IMPORTANCE OF SCRIPTURE

Not even Scripture is exempt from this universal approach of Schleiermacher. It must also take its position in the long line of temporarily valid expressions of religious experience; it ranks first in the line, but apart from that it is in no way different. Schleiermacher is careful to point out, therefore, that one ought not give the impression "that a doctrine must belong to Christianity because it is contained in Scripture, whereas in point of fact it is only

[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 691.
[30] *Ibid.*

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contained in Scripture because it belongs to Christianity."[31] The New Testament is the product of the Christian conscience of the primitive Church, and as an expression of some primitive element in the Christian experience it may influence present-day faith, "but in no sense conditionally on the acceptatnce of a special doctrine about these writings, as having had their origin in special divine revelation or inspiration."[32]

In Schleiermacher's system, the Holy Scriptures are "the first member in the series, ever since continued, of presentations of the Christian faith."[33] They may be considered a "norm" for all succeeding generations, but only in a very limited sense. Insofar as the early Church was a unity, a Christian community of the apostolic period, whose faith is reflected in Scripture, it possessed a valid expression of the Christian revelation. It could not, however, set forth its perception of that truth as a norm, pure and simple, to be used to determine the faith of later ages. There was much imperfection, much that was conditioned and temporal in their grasp of the truth of revelation, and it was this imperfect grasp that is set forth in the Scriptures. The very idea of revelation "signifies the *originality* of the fact which lies at the foundation of a religious communion, in the sense that this fact, as conditioning the individual content of the religious emotions which are found in the communion, cannot itself in turn be explained by the historical chain which precedes it."[34] Revelation happens at every moment, in each century, in every new community; it is not something of the past.

As a result, the various Churches must, with the passing of time, restate the essential and true message and only that element of Scripture which corresponds to the present experience can be said to persist. There is an historic link to this first expression of faith in Scripture, since we can note that *de facto* "all that has approved itself in the way of oral presentation of Christian piety in later ages of the Church has kept within the lines of these original forms, or is attached to them as an explanatory accompaniment."[35] But the ultimate norm remains the present community alone. Even in

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 593 (No. 128, 3).
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 593 (No. 128, 2).
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 594 (No. 129).
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 50 (No. 10, postscript).
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 594 (No. 129, 1).

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regard to Scripture, "the general rule is first of all to be applied that in every kind of fellowship the individual element approves itself only in so far as it gives expression to the common spirit. Here too, accordingly, everything of the kind which persists in influence alongside of Holy Scripture we must regard as homogeneous with Scripture; while nothing that does not persist can be given a place in the series."[36]

In this fashion the Churches of later centuries will restate that which has persisted through time because it is present now as an element of their personal religious experience, but they will also set aside those less perfect, confused or erroneous statements which the Apostolic Church had at the same time incorporated into its profession of faith in the Scriptures of the New Testament. These later Churches, however, differ from the apostolic Church in one respect. The canonical Scriptures could be fashioned only in that primitive Christian community; it alone was able to set forth a *relatively pure* expression of Christianity. The Church in later centuries could not reproduce these canonical Scriptures "for the living intuition of Christ was never again able to ward off all debasing influences in the same direct fashion, but only derivatively through the Scriptures and hence in dependence on them."[37]

This still does not mean that Scripture becomes an ultimate norm; Schleiermacher places great limits on the authority of Scripture. Whatever authority he grants he does "not ascribe uniformly to every part of our Holy Scriptures . . . so that casual expressions and what are merely side-thoughts do not possess the same degree of normativeness as belongs to whatever may at each point be the main subject."[38] Moreover, the content of Christianity is not limited to the apostolic period, much less to Scripture:

> Nor is it meant that every later presentation must be uniformly derived from the Canon or be germinally contained in it from the first. For since the Spirit was poured out on all flesh, no age can be without its own originality in Christian thinking.[39]

In the final analysis, it must be the Church of the present hour which determines what is in harmony with the scriptural message:

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 595.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 596 (No. 129, 2).
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] *Ibid.*

this Church alone can serve as the final norm for determining religious truth. The present consciousness of the Christian community is all-important, and as Flückiger notes, Schleiermacher consistently assigns to Scripture only a secondary role:

> Here Scripture no longer has the last word. In the course of the ecclesiastical development of doctrine, certain immanent principles evolve of themselves, which make it possible for the Church to distinguish between truth and error. . . . It is obvious that here the Scriptural Principle is replaced by an evolutionary Principle of Tradition. The principles which, as guiding principles, crystallize through time in the development of a dogmatic comprehension, the more the Church "learns to know itself," are also determinative for the ecclesiastical conviction concerning the truth of her dogma. And what are decisive for their further development are the immanent evolutionary tendencies of the ecclesiastical tradition itself.[40]

PROTESTANT LIBERALISM

In all of this we see the starting-point of what has come to be known as Protestant Liberalism, and it is this which justifies calling Schleiermacher the father of modern liberal theology. This liberal movement reached its climax in the last decade of the nineteenth century; the final stage of development is frequently associated with the famous work of Adolph Harnack, *The Essence of Christianity (Das Wesen des Christentums),* which is a transcript of extemporaneous lectures delivered at the University of Berlin in the winter of 1899-1900. By that time a good deal of liberal water had flowed under the bridge and what appeared in 1900 was not entirely identical with what Schleiermacher produced eighty or ninety years earlier. The philosophical basis, however, remained basically the same.

The later liberal theology placed great importance on Schleiermacher's insistence on the authority of Christian experience. As Dillenberger-Welch note in their work, *Protestant Christianity,* there were three principal movements in the nineteenth century which contributed to the eventual formation of liberal theology, and the *first* of these was the notion of religious experience as worked out by Schleiermacher:

[40] Flückiger, *op. cit.,* p. 98.

Enough has now been said to enable us to see the crucial place of Schleiermacher in the development of Protestant thought. Though Kant had anticipated the turn to a realm of subjective experience as the beginning-point for theology, Schleiermacher first made explicit the understanding that the teachings of the church are really explanations or explications of Christian experience. . . . The affirmations of faith are not dependent upon the constructions of natural theology or ethics, nor are they simply deduced from an infallible scripture or creed. The Bible and the creeds are important, but as records and interpretations of the experience of Christ.[41]

In addition to the teaching of Schleiermacher mention might also be made of the influence of Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889), whose theology of moral values was also incorporated into much of liberalism. Ritschl accepted the position of Schleiermacher, as well as the teachings of the higher critics, but went on to lay special emphasis upon the *ethical* goals of Christianity. He looked upon God as love alone and, in rejecting the notion of original sin. presented an optimistic view of the kingdom of God on earth as an organization of humanity through action inspired by love. For a Protestantism fast stripping itself of dogmatic truths, this ethical notion was ripe for acceptance as the true meaning of Christianity. Ritschl greatly influenced the formation of the "social gospel" in modern Protestantism.

BIBLICAL STUDIES

To the immanentist and subjectivist teaching of Schleiermacher and the moralism of Ritschl, there was then added a *second* element, namely, the approach of biblical (or historical) criticism which was being developed at about the same time. It is important to remember that in nineteenth century Protestantism, the religious philosophy of Schleiermacher and the findings of biblical criticism were actually two elements of one reality; the conclusions of the biblical critics were evaluated and interpreted against the backdrop of Schleiermacher's philosophy. It was a concern not for textual criticism, which was quite old by the nineteenth century, but for "higher criticism." Treated in union with Schleiermacher's position (shared, of course, by many another and expressed in slightly different language), biblical criticism in

[41] John Dillenberger-Claude Welch, *Protestant Christianity* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), p. 188.

the developing liberal theology of the last century meant treating the Scriptures as purely human creations, as expressions of the religious experience of the primitive Christian Church alone. The Bible was not considered either as an inspired book or as the Word of God in the sense of sixteenth century Protestantism (much less in the Catholic sense). As a result, the legitimate findings of scriptural study all took on a new meaning through this philosophic system with which they were associated.

We might note in passing that this may continue to be the cause of serious misunderstanding between scriptural scholars and dogmatic theologians within the Catholic Church today. Unfortunately, scriptural study has had to labor under the cloud of liberal theology —above all, under the cloud of Schleiermacher's philosophical basis. One of the principal tasks of the Catholic exegete is to relate objective findings to the philosophical and theological basis proper to Catholicism. He can no more deal simply with objective facts apart from some philosophical context in which they are to be interpreted than could the liberal scholars of the last century.

Upon occasion the Catholic scriptural scholar will state a legitimate finding of his own research that coincides closely with the findings of liberal scholars working under the influence of the philosophical approach of Schleiermacher and similar-minded men. It is this *basis* that makes all the difference, but occasionally the Catholic scholar neglects to point this out expressly. An answer to the question of the dogmatic theologian that goes no further than stating that "Of course, I am not involved in such a philosophical approach," will not help matters too much. Granting the state of affairs during the last century, all concerned with these matters need to spell out more distinctly the philosophical or theological basis upon which we are working. This will separate the scriptural position of Catholic scholars today from the context of liberal theology, and will keep the dogmatic theologian from assuming that a similar conclusion automatically indicates a philosophical basis akin to that of Schleiermacher.

It is in this light that we find an answer to the supposed opposition between Pius X and Pius XII. Dillenberger-Welch, for example, seem to have misunderstood the Catholic position on this point. They state that "Pius X specifically forbade Roman Catholic scholars to use the methods of 'secular' historical analysis on the

Bible," but conclude that "the effect of the proscription against the use of such critical methods has been moderated in recent years. . . ."[42] This is not quite the situation. Leo XIII and Pius XII were necessarily as much opposed to what Pius X condemned as this sainted Pontiff was himself. It is the philosophical basis coloring all of the interpretations offered both by the Protestant Liberals and the Modernists within the Catholic Church which makes the difference. In the days of Pius X it was well nigh impossible to disentangle the complicated web of Schleiermachian thought and the biblical criticism then offered. What was condemned was the common acceptance by Catholics of both systems—the philosophical and the critical—as evidenced in the teachings of the Modernists. A problem such as that can only be faced in the total complex of human activity in which it appears. The objective data concerning authorship of the Bible, literary forms, the relationship between the various books, and so forth, were then receiving an interpretation in accord with such philosophy às that of Schleiermacher. What was condemned by Rome then is condemned today.

On the other hand, it is considerably easier for the scriptural scholar to advance his findings today quite independent of the philosophical matrix into which similar findings were inserted by Liberals and Modernists at the turn of the century. Thus the Roman Pontiffs have given frequent encouragement to such scriptural studies, but only, of course, on the condition that the data would be related to the philosophical and theological basis proper to Catholicism. When this is neglected in any way, difficulties recur. The student of Scripture may ask that all give to him that charitable understanding urged by Pius XII, but at the same time, it would possibly be more prudent and would help matters no end if he himself would state in as clear a manner as possible the relationship of his data to Catholic theology. The exegete has a responsibility, certainly, to the whole of Catholic doctrine, and cannot, on the pretext of specialization, absolve himself from this further duty. To do so will only cause misunderstanding on the part of the dogmatic theologian, and may possibly be the occasion of others inadvertently interpreting the data for themselves in the context of something like that of Schleiermacher's philosophy.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 196.

All of this is in part a matter of human relations, and a thorough understanding of precisely what did happen in the Modernist crisis can help point the way to more adequate solutions today. Much the same must be said in regard to the use by Catholics of the exegetical conclusions of non-Catholic scriptural scholars. Apart from the more simple determination of texts, the meaning of words, and the like, it is obvious that any exegete must labor within the framework of his own philosophical or theological background. Hence the Catholic, when referring to these findings, could help clarify matters greatly by indicating precisely how his use of the same scientific data will differ from that of another scholar working on the basis of an entirely distinct philosophical and theological viewpoint.

THIRD ELEMENT

In addition to the philosophy of Schleiermacher and other immanentists, and the concerns of biblical criticism, a *third* cause contributed to the rise of liberal theology; this was the emphasis on science and the scientific method in the nineteenth century. Darwin's general notion of evolution extended far beyond the realm of natural science and pervaded the thinking of all men; and the scientific method of the nineteenth century historian came to be looked upon as the answer to all doubt and insecurity. Science would now establish the belief of Christianity, and it would appear—in conjunction with these other two elements—as a progressively evolving and changing expression of the religious experience of Christians in successive centuries. History in this sense appeared as that "historicism" so opposed by Pius XII as irreconcilable with Catholicism insofar as it designates a philosophical system limited to the temporal, to change and evolution, and which accordingly rejects the spiritual, the permanent and eternal.[43]

It was the most famous Protestant historian of the last century, Adolph Harnack, who finally brought all of these varied tendencies together and set forth a purely natural explanation of the essence of Christianity in these terms. It was a Christianity approached from the point of view of science and the scientific method, accompanied by a good deal of scepticism and an emphasis upon

[43] Cf. Pius XII, *Address to the Tenth International Congress of Historians* (September 7, 1955).

inner religious experience. It absorbed the spirit of evolution and constant improvement, and gave expression to its unbounded confidence in man and his future. This general spirit flowed over into all of Christian doctrine, and brought forth new "liberal interpretations" of every doctrine known to Christianity.[44]

MODERNISM

Within the Catholic Church there were those who were not untouched by these trends within Protestantism. Throughout the eighteenth century there had been repeated efforts on the part of Catholic theologians to incorporate Kantian philosophy into an explanation of Catholic doctrine. Many of the Traditionalists and Fideists used the Kantian doctrine as the starting-point for their own efforts to find God by some other natural means (since Kant had presumably destroyed the proofs from reason for God's existence). There were also those who had become acquainted with the philosophy of Schleiermacher and others of similar mentality; some had turned to the problems of biblical criticism, and encountered the philosophic basis associated with it in Protestant Liberalism. It might only be expected that there would be those who would conclude to something very much like the synthesis of Protestant liberal theology.

All of these tendencies came to light in the *Pascendi* of Pope St. Pius X. The Church had recognized the errors that were developing on some sides, and moved to stamp them out. The *Pascendi,* far more than the *Lamentabili,* points out the inter-relationship between the various trends of thought being pursued at that time. The *Lamentabili* makes no attempt to analyze; it is simply a series of sixty-five statements to be condemned since they pertain to this entire mentality. Included among them are such typical positions as these: the scientific method is supreme, and even the Church must submit to the judgment of exegetes;[45] God is not the author of Scripture, and inspiration is very limited;[46] The Bible must be interpreted as a merely human document;[47] revelation is nothing except the consciousness that man has of his relationship

[44] Cf. Dillenberger-Welch, *op. cit.*, pp. 217 ff.
[45] *Denz.* 2001 f. (Cf. Yzermans, *All Things in Christ,* pp. 223-228, No. 1 ff.)
[46] *Denz.* 2009, 2011. (Yzermans, No. 9, 11.)
[47] *Denz.* 2012. (Yzermans, No. 12.)

to God;[48] revelation did not end with the death of the last Apostle;[49] the divinity of Christ is something derived from the gradual evolution of the Christian conscience;[50] dogmas are only interpretations and evolutions of the Christian intelligence;[51] the chief articles of the Apostles' Creed did not have the same sense for the early Church as they have today;[52] modern Catholicism can be reconciled with true science only "if it is transformed into a non-dogmatic Christianity; that is to say, into a broad and liberal Protestantism."[53]

The roots of these statements lie in the field of Liberal Protestantism. This is the key to a proper understanding of Modernism within the Catholic Church. These isolated statements which were condemned, however, were set forth in the far more synthetic outline of Modernist thought presented by Pius X two months later in the *Pascendi,* in which the Pontiff explained the general Modernist teaching, its causes and its remedies.[54] The opening paragraphs of this encyclical read in large measure like a summary of the teaching of Schleiermacher. It is, in its own way, no less than amazing that the Catholic theologians involved in this debate were able, in the heat of controversy, to go to the very root of the problem. They saw at that time what appears so clear to us today, that is, that anyone wishing to understand the origins and development of Modernism within the Catholic Church must assuredly turn to a study of the writings of Schleiermacher and the manner in which they were interpreted by nineteenth century Liberal Protestantism.

There is an important difference between Modernism and Liberal Protestantism, of course. The Modernist attempted to bring into harmony both the traditional Catholic faith and these principles of Liberalism; this would naturally result in a rather distinct system. Obviously, because of the opposite directions taken by the underlying philosophical principles of both systems, this attempt could not possibly have succeeded. It was in reality an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable, and it could only have ended by the abandonment of one or the other element: either accept the condemnation

48 *Denz.* 2020. (Yzermans, No. 12.)
49 *Denz.* 2021. (Yzermans, No. 20.)
50 *Denz.* 2027. (Yzermans, No. 21.)
51 *Denz.* 2054. (Yzermans, No. 54.)
52 *Denz.* 2062. (Yzermans, No. 62.)
53 *Denz.* 2065. (Yzermans, No. 65.)
54 Cf. Part I of this article: *AER,* CXLIV (1961), 377 ff.

of Pius X or forsake the Catholic Church. This last was the choice of some. Alfred Loisy, for example, rose to defend the Church against Harnack's *The Essence of Christianity,* but his *L'évangile et l'Église* showed that he too had absorbed a good deal of the liberal position, even though he now aligned himself with those in the eschatological school of thought who reacted against much of Harnack's teaching. The same is true of the Tyrrell and the other leaders of the Modernist movement within the Church. Their defense of Catholicism indicated time and again that they had made more concessions to Protestant Liberalism that orthodox Catholic doctrine could endure.

SCHLEIERMACHER AND LIBERALISM TODAY

At the present time, the Liberalism of the last century is generally looked upon with disfavor among Protestant theologians. In a comparatively short time, a reaction set in against the extremes of liberal thought. Perhaps the best known rejection of this position is Karl Barth's commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans in 1918; this marked a violent rejection of liberal theology and a desire to return to more orthodox Protestant belief. Involved in this was the concern of the present century in the philosophy of Existentialism; this is perhaps the most noteworthy element in present-day Protestant developments. Apart from the Fundamentalist Churches, Protestant theology today is largely dominated by this type of thought, although the influence of Schleiermacher is far from dead. Any attempt to understand present-day Protestant thought, however, must necessarily involve an approach by way of Kantian principles, of Schleiermacher's application of these, and of the existentialist restatement of the concept of religious experience. Kierkegaard spoke out against the absolute deification of human reason in the philosophy of Hegel; he desired a more personalist approach to God. This is reflected in much of Protestant thought today which is concerned not so much with man's discovery of God, but with God's self-manifestation to man by which the personal confrontation of faith is accomplished:

> So far, the emphasis of recent thought is not unlike that of the liberal stress on religious experience. . . . But the connotation of this view is quite different from that of liberalism. . . . *God* reveals himself to faith. His Word to man stands in judgment on all human words and con-

ceptions. The final court of appeal is not rational norms, or conscience or experience, but the self-revelation of God, and there is a "given-ness" in revelation which makes it always "over-against" man.[55]

In line with this new concern for existentialistic philosophy, however, there has arisen a question as to whether the nineteenth century Liberals actually grasped the real import of what Schleiermacher was trying to say. There is an undeniable existentialist and personalist facet to his complicated thought, and for this reason Schleiermacher continues to exert an influence on modern religious thought. This explains in part the interest of such an existentially-motivated theologian as Karl Barth in the thought of Schleiermacher; it is not purely historical. Schleiermacher would probably have rejected the extremes of liberal thought in the era following his. Despite his immanentist concerns, he did not want to reduce Christianity to a purely natural and historical level. It is, therefore, the opinion of Flückiger that Barth has perceived the key to Schleiermacher's true thought, and "for the first time" has brought to light the originality and the exact meaning of Schleiermacher's scientific method.[56] As Barth views Schleiermacher, he is not to be studied either from a philosophical or a dogmatic point of view alone, but from a combination of the two. All of these elements must be used so that, through contrast and synthesis, the complete picture may be drawn. For Barth, therefore, religious truth in the teaching of Schleiermacher is "life." This is the key to his thought. It is, however, a life couched in existentialist terms—a life which is realized only in the endless breach between being and existence.[57]

Kierkegaard (1813-1855) was only twenty-one when Schleiermacher died, but the intellectual climate that produced Kierkegaard may already have influenced Schleiermacher. In many respects Kierkegaard was not any more anti-rational than Schleiermacher; neither of them would agree to any attempt to reduce religion to reason, and both refused to grant reason any special power in the realm of natural theology. While Schleiermacher admits that Chris-

[55] Dillenberger-Welch, *op. cit.*, p. 274. Cf. also pp. 255 ff.

[56] Cf. Karl Barth, "Schleiermacher," in *Die Theologie und die Kirche: Gesammelte Vortrage* (Zollikon, 1930), II; *Die protestantische Theologie in 19. Jahrhundert* (Zollikon-Zurich, 1947).

[57] Cf. Flückiger, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

tian dogmas can be presented rationally, in logical and intelligible phrases, he insists that they can be known or perceived only by a unique experience on the part of the Christian and not by reason:

> In one respect all Christian dogmas are supra-rational, in another they are all rational. They are supra-rational in the respect in which everything experiential is supra-rational. For there is an inner experience to which they may all be traced: they rest upon a *given;* and apart from this they could not have arisen, by deduction or synthesis, from universally recognized and communicable propositions. If the reverse were true, it would mean that you could instruct and demonstrate any man into being a Christian, without his happening to have had any experience.[58]

No less than Kierkegaard, Schleiermacher would oppose any attempt to freeze this vital experience into a closed, complete, static, dead system. He insists that the presentation of Christian dogmas in any rational form is only temporary; it describes the "prevalent doctrine," but nothing more. Life does not stand still in this system, and it is for this reason that Barth would single out the concept of "life" in Schleiermacher's thought. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, while stressing life and personal encounter, made explicit the notion of the "Moment" in which all Christians encounter Christ, something not noted in Schleiermacher.

It may possibly be that this more existentialistic outlook would account for the sharp division between the thought of Hegel and Schleiermacher which eventually even reached the point of personal antipathy. Hegel felt that an approach such as Schleiermacher's would in the end frustrate religion by disparaging the rational side of life.[59] On the other hand, it was largely by way of opposition to the totalitarian claims of Hegelian reason that Kierkegaard set forth his position, which would also suggest the possibility of further investigation into relationship of Schleiermacher's thought to present-day Existentialism.

Be that as it may, the fact remains that the religious philosophy of Friedrich Schleiermacher did exercise a great influence on the development of Protestant liberal theology. Despite the influence

[58] Schleiermacher, *op. cit.*, p. 67 (No. 13, postscript).

[59] Cf. Richard B. Brandt, *The Philosophy of Schleiermacher* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941), Appendix II: "Schleiermacher and Hegel," pp. 322-326.

of Barth and other existentialist theologians, it is illuminating to note a continued interest in basic liberal viewpoints. Even with tags of Neo-Orthodoxy and Neo-Liberalism, there has been for a long time a feeling that present-day Protestant theology has not really approached too closely to orthodoxy nor bid too final a farewell to Liberalism. As Fr. Gustave Weigel has remarked, "Seemingly, therefore, the Neo-Orthodox are a Center theology, but a closer examination of their thought has led many critics to believe that they are basically liberals in a strange guise."[60] Neo-Liberalism is even more obviously attached to its nineteenth century predecessors.[61]

This has been brought out most strikingly, however, by the remarks of H. Richard Niebuhr in 1960. He himself was originally a product of the liberal theology of Protestantism in the last century. From this he passed over into the concerns of Karl Barth, generally referred to as Neo-Orthodoxy. But at present, he has tended to reject Barth in turn, and return to a theological position more in line with that which he had adopted originally—a liberal point of view. Speaking of the post-liberal theologians in Protestantism he has this to say:

> So many of them seem to me to have gone back to othodoxy as right teaching, right doctrine, and to faith as *fides,* an assent; they tend, it seems to me, toward the definition of Christian life in terms of right believing, of Christianity as the true religion, and otherwise toward the assertion of the primacy of ideas over personal relations. When I think about this I have to say to myself that important as theological formulations are for me, they are not the basis of faith but only one of its expressions, and that not the primary one. I discover further a greater kinship with all theologians of Christian experience than with the theologians of Christian doctrine. So I find myself, though with many hesitations, closer to Edwards and Schleiermacher, to Coleridge, Bushnell and Maurice than to Barth and the dogmatic biblical theology current today in wide circles. . . . To state my understanding of our theological situation briefly. I believe that the Barthian correction of the line of march begun in Schleiermacher's day was absolutely

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[60] Gustave Weigel, S.J., "A Survey of Protestant Theology in Our Day," *Proceedings: The Catholic Theological Society of America, 1953* (Dunwoodie, Yonkers, N.Y.: St. Joseph's Seminary, 1953), p. 59.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

essential, but that it has become an overcorrection and that Protestant theology can minister to the church's life more effectively if it resumes the general line of march represented by the evangelical, empirical and critical movement.[62]

In this we see striking evidence that the spirit of Liberalism and Modernism is far from dead; these approaches to Christianity are not yet ready for the historical junk pile. Obvious traces of liberal thought have continued to influence present-day Protestant thought and scriptural study, despite such newly hewn names as Neo-Orthodoxy, Neo-Liberalism, or Existentialistic Theology. While Bultmann and Tillich have reacted against the liberal tradition, there may yet remain some question as to whether they have not simply out-liberalized the Liberals in their wave of antisupernaturalism.[63]

In any event, the movement influenced so forcefully by the teaching of Schleiermacher is still very much with us, and Catholic theologians have a great need of understanding this historical background. Without such a knowledge we can only too easily misinterpret the past and misunderstand the present.

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[62] H. Richard Niebuhr, "Reformation: Continuing Imperative," in *The Christian Century*, 77 (March 2, 1960) 249, 250.

[63] Cf. Nels F. S. Ferre, *Searchlights on Contemporary Theology* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), pp. 89-91.

CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS ABOUT MEMBERSHIP IN THE TRUE CHURCH

To the man who reads twentieth-century theological literature at all perceptively, it becomes more and more apparent that the central area of interest to the writers of our time is and has been the science of ecclesiology. And, within the area of the *tractatus de ecclesia,* there is one essential point which is and has been at issue. It is the teaching that the Roman Catholic Church, the religious organization over which the Bishop of Rome presides, is actually the one and only supernatural kingdom of God on earth, the one and only institution outside of which no one at all is saved, and outside of which there is no remission of sins. Around this dogma of the Catholic faith most of the discussion in twentieth-century theological literature has revolved.

Fundamentally questions in this field have been raised in three different ways. First of all some have tried to explain away the Catholic dogma that there is no salvation outside of the Catholic Church. One of the few good results that followed from the unfortunate debates centering around Father Feeney's group at St. Benedict's Center was the issuance of the Holy Office instruction *Suprema haec sacra,* dated Aug. 8, 1949, and published officially with its authorized English translation in the Oct., 1952, issue of *The American Ecclesiastical Review.*[1] This document made it very clear to the men of our own time that the Church had by no means abandoned or modified the age old dogma to the effect that there is no salvation outside of the Catholic Church. As a matter of fact this Holy Office letter put the *magisterium* itself on record as asserting what had been, since the latter part of the sixteenth century, the teaching of the best theologians of the Church: the doctrine that the Catholic Church itself is definitely and actually necessary for the attainment of eternal salvation with the necessity of precept and with the necessity of means.

The second way in which the basic teaching that the Roman Catholic Church is the one and only kingdom of God on earth according to the dispensation of the New Testament has been

[1] *AER,* CXXVII, 4 (Oct., 1952), 307-15.

denied in our era has been through the tactic of implying that, in one way or another, the Roman Catholic Church was not exactly identical with the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, or with the Communion of Saints, or with the Kingdom or the City of God. Substantially this move against the Church was repressed in the encyclical *Mystici Corporis Christi,* issued June 29, 1943, and again in the encyclical *Humani generis,* issued Aug. 12, 1950. These two documents insisted upon the fact that the Roman Catholic Church is exactly the same thing as the Mystical Body, and thus they made it clear to any student of theology that the other names of the Church also apply exactly and exclusively to the religious society over which the Bishop of Rome presides as visible head.

Most recently those who, mostly for reasons of false irenicism, wish to make it appear that the Roman Catholic Church is not quite the same thing as the supernatural kingdom of God outside of which there is no salvation have adopted a different tactic. They have concentrated their attention on the teaching about membership in the true Church, in such a way as to lead people to imagine that the members of the true Church include individuals who could not by any means be represented as members of the Roman Catholic Church. Usually this is done in a somewhat complicated fashion. A few days before the writing of this article, however, I received a letter from a very prominent professor of theology who protested against my book, *The Catholic Church and Salvation,* and against Father John King's article "Salvation and the Church,"[2] on the grounds that we "refuse membership to others than Roman Catholics." This is the first time I have ever seen the full meaning of this position admitted by one of these men themselves. Apparently the writer of the letter, who is a brilliant and successful teacher of theology, did not realize the force of his own statement. He was admitting that according to his own judgment, the group which constitutes the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, the group which *is* the true Church of Jesus Christ, is definitely not identical with the society which is made up of Roman Catholics. Very clearly this man is not completely and vitally aware that the religious organization over which the Bishop of Rome presides, the society

[2] Father King's "Salvation and the Church" appeared in *AER,* CXLIV, 3 (March, 1961), 180-201. *The Catholic Church and Salvation* was published by Newman at Westminster, Maryland, in 1958. An English edition was brought out last year by Sands of London.

which we and the world know as the Roman Catholic Church, is actually the one and only supernatural kingdom of God on earth, outside of which there is no salvation.

This is a point of the utmost urgency for the priests and the seminarians of our own time. After all, the great mystery of God's supernatural economy according to the dispensation of the New Testament is the outstanding truth that this visible society, this organization in which bad members are mingled with the good, is actually the one and only supernatural kingdom of God on earth. There are people who flinch at this truth, and some of them, unfortunately, are within the fold of the Catholic Church itself. It is obviously one of the truths most frequently attacked in our own time. It is a truth which we are most tempted to overlook or to pass over in order that we may make the teaching of the Catholic Church more acceptable to those who are not of the Catholic faith. In the actual situation in which we find ourselves, our fidelity to Our Lord would seem to be measurable by our insistence upon the divinity of His visible Church, the Roman Catholic Church, and by our refusal to modify the Catholic teaching and dogma to the effect that this visible society is the one and only kingdom of God on earth according to the economy of the New Testament.

Now what is precisely the teaching of the Church with reference to membership in the Church? Obviously the basic text of the *magisterium* with which we must be concerned is the statement in the encyclical *Mystici Corporis Christi.* To quote Pope Pius XII:

> In Ecclesiae autem membris reapse ii soli annumerandi sunt, qui regenerationis lavacrum receperunt veramque fidem profitentur, neque a Corporis compage semet ipsos misere separarunt, vel ob gravissima admissa a legitima auctoritate seiuncti sunt.[3]

The NCWC translation of the *Mystici Corporis Christi* gives this version of the statement about membership in the Church or the Mystical Body of Christ.

> Actually only those are to be included as members of the Church who have been baptized and profess the true faith, and who have not been so unfortunate as to separate themselves from the unity of the Body, or been excluded by legitimate authority for grave faults committed.[4]

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[3] *AAS*, XXXV (1943), 202. In the Gregorian University Press text, with notes by Sebastian Tromp, S.J., this is par. 21.

[4] NCWC translation, par. 22.

The one fairly serious imperfection of this rendering is to be found in the use of the term "unity" as a translation of the Latin "compage." The Latin word carries the implication of a physical connection, of a *visible* principle of unity. *Harper's Latin Dictionary* uses the English terms "joining together," "connection," "joint," "structure," and "embrace" as translations of the Latin "compages" or "compago."[5] Much the same explanation of the meaning of the term "compages" is to be found in Leverett's *Lexicon*.[6] In *Harper's Latin Dictionary* the expression "compaginibus corporis" is rendered in English as "bodily structures." Thus, in a more accurate translation of the *Mystici Corporis Christi,* the word "structure" might very well replace the term "unity" that was included in the NCWC version. Such a change would bring out the very evident inference that the Sovereign Pontiff who issued the *Mystici Corporis Christi* intended to say that baptized persons lose their membership in the true Church of Jesus Christ, not by *any* act against the forces or factors that tend to unify the Church, but only by acts which destroy within the people performing those acts those *visible* factors or *tangible* factors that go to make up the visible or outward or bodily (as distinct from the invisible or spiritual) bond of union within the true Church of Jesus Christ.

The outward or bodily bond of union, joining men to Our Lord and to each other in His Church, is made up of the baptismal profession of the true faith, the communion of the sacraments, and subjection to legitimate ecclesiastical pastors, and ultimately, of course, to the one Vicar of Christ on earth, the Roman Pontiff. The inward, or spiritual, or invisible bond of unity with and within the Church is to be found, according to St. Robert Bellarmine, in "the internal gifts of the Holy Ghost, faith, hope, charity, etc."[7] The first of these bonds of unity was the factor which St. Robert designated as the "body" within the Church in the famed second chapter of his *De ecclesia militante*. The other was the "soul"

[5] Cf. *Harper's Latin Dictionary: A New Latin Dictionary Founded on the Translation of Freund's Latin-German Lexicon.* Edited by E. A. Andrews. Revised, enlarged, and in great part rewritten by Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short (New York: American Book Co., 1907), *ad loc.*

[6] Cf. *A New and Copious Lexicon of the Latin Language,* edited by F. P. Leverett (Boston, 1838), *ad loc.*

[7] *De ecclesia militante,* c. 2.

within the Church, according to the metaphor employed in that same chapter.

It was the contention of St. Robert and of the great ecclesiologists upon whom he depended that all and only those who are joined to Our Lord and to each other by the external or bodily bond of union within the Church are members or parts of the Church militant according to the dispensation of the New Testament. That was the meaning of his classical definition of the Church as "the assemblage *(coetus)* of men, bound together *(colligatus)* by the profession of the same Christian faith and by the communion of the same sacraments, under the rule of legitimate pastors, and especially of the one Vicar of Christ on earth, the Roman Pontiff."[8] For St. Robert and all the other great theologians who had followed the tradition of St. Augustine, it was of course quite apparent that the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church is actually held together and joined to Our Lord by the bonds of faith, hope, and charity. Such is the intimate nature of the Church as the one and only supernatural kingdom of God on earth according to the economy of the New Testament. Yet it was none the less obvious that, according to the teaching of God set forth in the sources of revelation, the supernatural kingdom of God on earth according to the dispensation of the New Testament is a society or an organization composed only of individuals who are united to Our Lord and to each other by the external bonds of unity. It was clear that a person remains a *part* or a *member* of this supernatural kingdom of God on earth as long as he retains these external bonds of unity, even if he should reject, not only charity, but even faith and hope themselves.

Now we come to the question: does the pronouncement about membership in the Church in the *Mystici Corporis Christi* simply repeat the teaching of St. Robert Bellarmine on this point?

First of all, it must be made clear that there was definitely one element in St. Robert's teaching on membership in the Church which has been excluded by Pope Pius XII in the great encyclical letter. The Doctor of the Church taught very clearly, in the tenth chapter of his *De ecclesia militante,* that the baptismal character was not required for membership in the Church, but only a putative

[8] *Ibid.*

baptism.[9] Quite clearly, since the issuance of the *Mystici Corporis Christi,* this particular part of St. Robert's teaching is no longer acceptable as Catholic doctrine. Pope Pius XII insisted that the reception of baptism was requisite in order that a man might be numbered among the members of the Church.

It must be remembered, however, that St. Robert's teaching about the sufficiency of putative baptism for membership in the Church did not form an essential part of his thesis. What made the teaching of the *De ecclesia militante* memorable in the history of Catholic theology was the fact that St. Robert insisted that all of the elements requisite for membership in the true Church of the New Testament were visible factors, because the Church militant of the New Testament is, according to the teaching and the decree of God Himself, "an assembly of men as visible and palpable as the assemblage of the Roman people, or the kingdom of France, or the republic of Venice."[10]

Certainly the *Mystici Corporis Christi* statement about membership in the Church is quite in line with the teaching of the *De ecclesia militante.* According to Pope Pius XII, four factors alone are necessary in order that a man be counted as a member of the true Church. These are (1) the reception of baptism, and thus the possession of the baptismal character, (2) the profession of the true faith, which is, of course, the faith of the Catholic Church, (3) the fact that a person has not cut himself away from the structure or the fabric of the "Body," which is, of course, the Church itself, and (4) the fact that a person has not been expelled from the membership of the Church by competent ecclesiastical authority.

It is the nature of the third of these four factors which, in the context of the encyclical, is not completely clear. Very definitely a person would cut himself off from the structure of the ecclesiastical Body if he entered into a state of *public* heresy or apostasy. But that condition had already been taken care of in the naming of the second of the factors which the *Mystici Corporis Christi* lists as requisite for membership in the true Church. Very definitely the "cutting away" mentioned in the third point of this statement might involve entrance into the state of schism. But it could, of course, imply that some act against the spiritual or invisible bond

[9] Cf. *ibid.,* c. 10.
[10] *Ibid.,* c. 2.

of unity within the Church might also cut a person away from membership in the Church. The text of the *Mystici Corporis Christi* is not, in itself, sufficiently clear on this point.

Yet, over the course of the years, it has become increasingly obvious that the common teaching of the Catholic theologians holds that people are *members* of the Church or *parts* of the Church only by the possession of these visible or palpable factors. The term "member of the Church" can legitimately be applied only to those baptized persons who have not frustrated the force of their baptismal characters by public heresy or apostasy, or by schism, and who have not been expelled from the Church by competent ecclesiastical authority. The theological demonstration that backs up this thesis is still and always will be the "proof from reason" which St. Robert Bellarmine alleged in support of his teaching in the *De ecclesia militante.*[11] More effectively, perhaps, than any other writer in the history of the Catholic Church, St. Robert pointed to the fact that the basic Catholic claim, that the Church militant according to the dispensation of the New Testament is essentially a *visible* Church, involves and includes the teaching that membership in the Church is possessed by all and only the people who have those factors which go to make up the visible or external bond of unity within the Church of God.

That was the great point at issue between the Catholics and the heretics of the Reformation: whether the true Church of Jesus Christ according to the economy of the New Testament is or is not an organized society. It was and it still is the contention of the enemies of the Catholic Church that the true kingdom of God or the chosen people of the New Testament is not really a society or an organization at all, but that it is merely the sum-total of all the good people, or all the people in the state of grace, in the world. On the other hand, the Catholic Church, as the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, continues to bring out the truth which Our Lord taught in His parables of the kingdom—the fact that the Church or the kingdom of the New Testament is an organization, a social unit within which bad members willl be mingled with the good until the end of time. The Church holds and must always continue to hold that it is a social unit composed of individuals whose membership depends, not upon the invisible or spiritual factors that go

[11] Cf. *ibid.*, c. 10.

to make up the inward bond of unity with Our Lord in His kingdom, but entirely and exclusively on the visible or bodily factors that constitute the external bond of unity.

Let us understand this well. When we speak of a member of the Church (or, for that matter, of any other social unit), we mean one of the persons who goes to make up this gathering or group. After all, the true Church of Jesus Christ is a group of people now existing in this world. The people who compose or constitute or go to make up this group are the members of the Church. The *membrum ecclesiae* is the *pars ecclesiae*.

In the last analysis, the great proof of the fact that the Church militant of the New Testament is essentially a visible Church (that is to say, an organized society, rather than merely the sum-total of the people who possess certain spiritual gifts or goods) is to be found in the divine constitution of the Church militant itself. It is basic that the Church of the New Testament was so constituted by Our Lord that definite men were given responsibility for the spiritual welfare of their fellow members of the Church, and thus given definite jurisdictional authority over these others. It must be considered as axiomatic that only members of this kingdom of God on earth are given ecclesiastical authority over their fellow members. And, if membership were to depend in any way at all on the possession of an invisible factor, there would be no such thing as certainty about the right of any man to call himself a member of the Church, and *a fortiori* there would be no such thing as certitude about the right of any man to issue decrees binding in conscience on the members of the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ Our Lord.

Now it must be understood that the Church militant of the New Testament, as a supernatural entity, is not to be judged by ordinary human standards. Concretely, a man may pertain to this society or in some way or other be "within" it other than by membership in its ranks. In order to appreciate our question, and in order to realize the harm that has been done by careless and unscientific writing on membership in the Catholic Church, we must consider the other ways in which a man can be said to "belong" in some way to this organization.

(1) Every baptized person is a subject of the Catholic Church, in the sense that he has the baptismal character which, unless

frustrated by some personal act of the man who possesses it, would automatically gather any man within the unity of membership of the true Church of Christ. Baptism belongs to the Church. It is always objectively a wrong thing for any baptized person not to be a member of the true Church. Thus in itself, the baptismal character constitutes a man as subject to the laws of the Catholic Church. It is true, of course, that ordinarily the Church makes no attempt to apply its own statutes to those who are baptized but who are non-members of the Church through no personal fault of their own. Yet, by the constitution of the supernatural order itself, the man who has the baptismal character remains and must remain one to whom the legislation of the true Church can apply.

At the same time, however, nothing can be more obvious than the fact that not every person who is baptized is a member of the Catholic Church. The true Church of Jesus Christ, which is His one supernatural kingdom and His Mystical Body in this world, is the religious organization which accepts Pope John XXIII as its visible head in this world. The theologian who claims that every baptized person is in some way a member of the Church cannot be speaking seriously, if he has any understanding of the meaning of the term "member" as it is used with reference to the Catholic Church. He should realize that the Mystical Body of Christ in this world is not a social unit made up of Catholics and members of heretical and schismatic groups.

If people who are members of heretical or schismatic groups are in any way members of the true Church of Jesus Christ, then the true Church is definitely not the social unit that accepts the Bishop of Rome as its visible head. If we are to sum this matter up in three statements, we would have to say:

(A) Every baptized person is a subject of the Catholic Church.

(B) Every baptized person should be, and would be, if the unifying force of his baptismal character were not thwarted by some personal and external but not necessarily sinful act, a member of the Catholic Church.

(C) Not every baptized person is a member of the Catholic Church.

(2) Far more involved is the case of that person who is not a member of the Catholic Church, but who is "within" the Church in such a way as to enjoy the life of sanctifying grace. It is abso-

lutely imperative for the well being of contemporary theology that the situation of this individual be accurately analyzed.

It is one of the most frequently and insistently taught dogmas of the Catholic faith that outside of the Catholic Church no one at all is saved, that outside of this society there is neither salvation nor the remission of sins.[12] According to the mechanics of the English langauge, one who is not "outside of" some physical or social entity must be said to be, in some way or other, "within" it. Hence it must be said that any non-member of the Catholic Church who has the remission of sins, which is to say the gift of sanctifying grace, or who dies in the state of grace so as to attain eternal salvation, must be or have died in some way "within" the Catholic Church in a status other than that of a member.

The Holy Office Letter *Suprema haec sacra,* summing up and stating in an authoritative manner what had always been the teaching of the ***sanior pars*** of the Church's scholastic theologians, asserted that the non-member of the Catholic Church who thus attained to eternal salvation "within" it was joined to the Church *voto et desiderio.* The entire sentence is so important that it should be repeated here. The Holy Office wrote: "Quandoquidem ut quis aeternam obtineat salutem, non semper exigitur ut *reapse* Ecclesiae tamquam membrum incorporetur, sed id saltem requiritur, ut eidem *voto et desiderio* adhaereat."[13] And this teaching definitely must be seen in the light of the tremendously important explanation given in this same document: "Neque etiam putandum est quodcumque votum Ecclesiae ingrediendae sufficere ut homo salvetur. Requiritur enim ut votum quo quis ad Ecclesiam ordinetur, perfecta caritate informetur: nec *votum implicitum* effectum habere potest, nisi homo fidem habeat supernaturalem."[14]

The encyclical *Mystici Corporis Christi,* with a less developed terminology, speaks of the possibility of non-members of the Church being *ordered* to the Church "inscio quodam desiderio ac voto."[15] The *Suprema haec sacra* interprets this passage of the *Mystici*

[12] There are over twenty statements of this dogma in the documents in Denzinger's *Enchiridion symbolorum.* Eight of such statements are studied in *The Catholic Church and Salvation.*

[13] *AER,* CXXVII, 4 (Oct., 1952), 308.

[14] *Ibid.,* 309.

[15] *AAS,* XXXV (1943), 243. This is par. 101 in Tromp's edition of the text. The translation of this passage is in par. 103 of the NCWC translation.

Corporis Christi as showing that people in this condition, that is, those who are ordered to the Church by an unconscious intention or desire, are not excluded from the possibility of attaining to eternal salvation.

The *Suprema haec sacra* makes it completely clear that those who are in a position to be saved only by reason of the fact that they have at least an implicit intention or desire to enter the Church and to remain within it are not *reapse* or in reality members of the true Church. In other words, the social unit which is the supernatural kingdom of God in this world is not composed of people who intend or desire to enter it. As a matter of fact, if we look at the terminology carefully, we can easily see that a statement to the contrary involves a self-contradiction. It is impossible to desire to enter a social unit of which one is already a member or a part.

Since the publication of the *Suprema haec sacra* it is clearly contrary to Catholic doctrine to hold or to teach that, in order to be "within" the Church in such a way as to be able to attain eternal salvation, a person must be some kind of a member of the Church. The very force of the terminology employed in the Holy Office letter runs counter to such a claim. The *Suprema haec sacra* teaches unequivocally that a man may be saved without ever really *(reapse)* becoming a member of the Church. It is definitely a disservice to the cause of Catholic theology to insinuate that, in order to be saved, a man has to be in some way a member of the Church. But, by the same token, it is imperative that the difference between being in the Church as a member, and being "within" it by reason of a desire, a prayer, or an intention to enter this society be very well understood.

It seems to me that this distinction can best be understood when the Church is considered for what it is, an actively working society. Perhaps the best statement of this aspect of teaching about the Church is brought out in the encyclical *Humanum genus,* issued by Pope Leo XIII April 20, 1884. Here is the key passage from the ecclesiological portion of this great encyclical.

> The race of man, after its miserable fall from God . . . separated into two diverse parts, of which the one steadfastly contends for truth and virtue, the other for those things which are contrary to virtue and to truth. The one is the kingdom of God on earth, the true Church of

Jesus Christ, and those who desire from their heart to be united with it so as to gain salvation must of necessity serve God and His only-begotten Son with their whole mind and with an entire will. The other is the kingdom of Satan, in whose possession and control are all whosoever follow the fatal example of their leader and of our first parents, those who refuse to obey the divine and eternal law, and who have many aims of their own in contempt of God, and many aims also against God.

This twofold kingdom St. Augustine keenly discerned and described after the manner of two cities, contrary in their laws because striving for contrary objects; and with subtle brevity he expressed the efficient cause of each in these words: "Two loves formed two cities: the love of self, reaching even to contempt of God, an earthly city; and the love of God, reaching even to contempt of self, a heavenly one." At every period of time each has been in conflict with the other, with a variety and multiplicity of weapons and of warfare, although not always with equal ardor and assault.[16]

The first key explanation in this passage is to be found in the statement: "Alterum Dei est in terris regnum, vera scilicet Iesu Christi Ecclesia, cui qui volunt ex animo et convenienter ad salutem adhaerescere, necesse est Deo et Unigenito Filio eius tota mente ac summa voluntate servire."

It is quite obvious that, in the assertion, Pope Leo XIII was not speaking precisely about membership in the Church. He was describing the work necessary for any person who wished to "adhere" or to be joined to the Church in such a way as to obtain salvation "within" it. That work is the service of God, the work of religion, animated by charity, and obviously enlightened by true divine faith.

The *Humanum genus* describes the true Church of Jesus Christ as a social unit performing a definite work in this world, in the face of a perpetual opposition coming from the kingdom of Satan. The work of the kingdom of God is the work of the Church alone, because the Catholic Church alone is the true supernatural kingdom of God according to the dispensation of the New Testament. The one social unit performing that operation is the Church, but

[16] The original Latin text of this passage is in Gasparri's *Codicis Iuris Canonici Fontes*, III, 221 f. The English translation is from Wynne's edition of *The Great Encyclical Letters of Pope Leo XIII* (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1903), p. 83.

there are, in the mercies of God's grace, persons who are not members of the Church working with the Church for the attainment of those objectives for which the Church alone, among all the social units in this world, really works and fights to achieve. The man who has a sincere *votum* or *desiderium,* enlightened by faith and animated by charity, to enter the true Church of Jesus Christ is thus one who actually intends to work for the objective of the Church. And a man's intention to work for the glory of God through the salvation of souls in according to God the supernatural service of acknowledgement due to Him because of His supreme excellence and our complete dependence on Him is an intention of worshipping God. It is a religious intention which is manifested to God Himself in the act of prayer.

The prayer of the Catholic Church is expressed in the *Pater noster,* the formula of petition to God which was given to the disciples of Christ by Our Lord Himself. The great commentary on that prayer is the series of petitions which constitute the prayers of the Mass. The man who desires to be within the Church, and whose desire is such that it brings him "within" the true Church in such a way as to attain salvation "within" it, is one who intends and desires and prays for those objectives that are indicated in the text of the *Pater noster* and in the petitions of the Mass. And this remains true even though, through no fault of his own, the individual who is thus "within" the Church does not have a clear and explicit understanding of some of these individual objectives.

Prayer is the expression of an intention. And an intention is an effective act of the will. A man works in accordance and in line with his intention.

Thus it is apparent that the man who is not a member or a part of the Church, but who has a salvific intention or desire to enter it and to remain within it, is actually praying and working along with the Church for the objectives of Jesus Christ. In this way he is truly "within" the Church. And, since the work of the Church is accomplished in the face of serious and never-ending opposition, the non-member of the Church who has a salvific intention to join it is actually fighting for Our Lord "within" His company. He is actually serving God with his whole mind and his whole heart, and thus he is joined to the Church even in his status as a non-member of this society.

It is quite obvious that this condition can exist only as long as, for one reason or another, membership in the Church is impossible for this individual. When it becomes possible for a man to become a member of the Church, or when he becomes aware of the true status of the Catholic Church in the supernatural order, he can no longer work effectively for Our Lord except as a member of His Church.

Furthermore it must be remembered that it is possible for a member of the true and visible Church of Jesus Christ to be an unworthy member and to work against the objectives of the Church.

We can sum up the teaching on the differences between being "within" the Church as a member or part of the Church, and being "within" it in such a way as to be saved, even apart from membership, under these four points.

(1) It must be remembered that, in the economy of the New Testament, the supernatural kingdom of God or the true Church of Jesus Christ is a society, an organization. This, in the last analysis, is the center of the mystery of God's dealings with His people in the dispensation of the New Testament. The great wonder of God's mercy is not to be found merely in the fact that there is a chosen people, a supernatural kingdom of God of the New Dispensation, but in the fact that this people, this kingdom, has been constituted by God Himself as an organization or a society, in which bad members are mingled with the good until the end of time. Because it is so constituted, membership in this kingdom of God or Church of the New Testament is attained only by the possession of the factors which go to make up the visible or bodily bond of ecclesiastical unity. And because it is so constituted, some individuals with this company have responsibility for and authority over their fellow members, responsibility and authority given to them by Our Lord Himself.

(2) Although the Church is the only social unit on earth working for the objectives of Jesus Christ, there are individuals who, through the power of God's grace, work for that same objective without being in any way members of the Church. These are the individuals who are "within" the Catholic Church by a salutary *votum* or *desiderium*. This *votum* or *desiderium* is salutary only when it is enlightened by true supernatural faith and motivated by true charity, and, obviously, only when it is impossible for the

individual to be "within" the Church as a member. The individuals who are "within" the Church only by a salutary *votum* or *desiderium* pray and work, against fierce opposition, for the accomplishment of the purposes of the Incarnation.

The society which is the only true supernatural kingdom of God on earth in the dispensation of the New Testament is composed or made up of its members. The men and women who have a salutary *votum* or *desiderium* of entering the Church are "within" it insofar as they are working and fighting within it for the attainment of the objectives of Jesus Christ. Yet they are definitely not parts or members of this society.

(3) It is possible for individuals who are members of the Church to work for the objectives of Satan, the prince of this world. Thus we have the situation in which the Church, and the visible Catholic Church alone, must be recognized as the one supernatural kingdom of God on earth, working and fighting alone for the glory of the living God. And, at the same time, there are non-members of this society who work for this objective "within" the Church, and some members of the Church who work against that objective while still retaining their membership in this society.

(4) The baptismal character is the basic force incorporating a man as a member into the true Church of Jesus Christ in this world according to the dispensation of the New Testament. Yet it is quite obvious that not every baptized person is a Catholic. Very definitely the society which is the one and only supernatural kingdom of God in this world is not made up or composed of all baptized persons. The unifying force of the baptismal character can be and is frustrated by public heresy or apostasy, by schism, and by expulsion from the Church. To say or even to insinuate that all baptized people are members of the Church is to deny, at least by implication, the central dogma of ecclesiology, the divinely revealed teaching that tells us that the Roman Catholic Church, the religious society which recognizes and accepts the Bishop of Rome as its visible head, is actually the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ.

Now we come to another question frequently discussed in contemporary theological writing: the question as to whether or not there are degrees or kinds of membership within the true Church. There are some writers and teachers, especially in this country, who feel that people who are subjects of the Church by reason of

their possession of the baptismal character and those who are "within" the Church by reason of a salutary *votum* or *desiderium* of entering it are to be designated as "incomplete" or as "virtual" or as "imperfect" members of the true Church. These individuals are under the impression that the statement in the *Mystici Corporis Christi* about those who alone are to be reckoned as members of the Church applies only to people whom they call "members in the strict sense." They imagine that there are other kinds of membership. And they definitely seem convinced that, if they can manage in some way to justify the practice of calling some groups of people who are obviously not Roman Catholics "members" of the true Church, they will have done a service to the cause of ecclesiastical unity.

In order to achieve their purpose, they depict the teaching of the *Mystici Corporis Christi* on membership in the Church as relating only to members in the strict sense, or in the strictest sense of the term. In so doing they misrepresent the doctrine of this great encyclical letter. The document says, of those who possess the four characteristics it mentions as necessary for membership: "In Ecclesiae autem membris reapse ii soli annumerandi sunt."[17] Now "reapse" means "really" or "actually." It cannot be said to mean "in the strict sense of the term." According to the doctrine of the *Mystici Corporis Christi* there are none other than those who possess these four characteristics who can rightfully be counted or designated as members of the true Church of Jesus Christ. To say or to infer that there are others who can in any way be called real members of the Church, or that there are others to whom the term "member of the Church" can accurately be applied, is to contradict rather than to explain the clear teaching of the *Mystici Corporis Christi.*

Furthermore the practice of designating non-Catholics as "virtual" or as "incomplete" members of the Church involves a serious misuse of theological language. The importance of the thesis on membership in the Church rests on the fact that, according to the designs of God's providence, the true and only Church militant of the New Testament is an organized society, a group composed of people who are recognizable as parts of this group on account of their possession of certain recognizable characteristics. The central

[17] *AAS,* XXXV (1943), 202; Tromp, par. 21; NCWC translation, par. 22.

mystery of the economy of the New Testament is the fact that the one and only supernatural kingdom of God is the *congregatio fidelium* or the *collectio catholicorum*.[18] It is the truth that the group or assembly that constitutes the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ on earth is the society composed of the Catholics, the baptized people who profess the faith of the Roman Church, who are admitted to the sacramental life of the Church, and who live as subjects (in the religious order) to their proper ecclesiastical pastors, and ultimately to the Bishop of Rome. And, in the eyes of our own people and of non-Catholics, that mystery is beclouded by those who try to make men imagine that at least some non-Catholics are "incomplete" or "partial" or "virtual" members of the Church.

The member of the Church is the *pars ecclesiae,* one of those of whom the society which is the Mystical Body of Christ on earth is composed. It is not possible to be partially or incompletely or virtually a part of a society. One is either a part or not a part, a member or not a member. If he possesses some of the requisites for membership, but not all of them, then a man is not a member and should not be designated as such.

Finally there is one more way that is being used in our own times to obscure the fact that only Catholics are members of the true Church. It is a way with which St. Robert Bellarmine was quite familiar. In his *De ecclesia militante* he writes:

Melchior Cano says that catechumens can be saved because, although they are not of the Church *(etsi non sunt de Ecclesia)* which is properly

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[18] These two formulae were considered as the standard definitions of the true Church during the earlier days of scholastic ecclesiology. Launoy wrote his famed letter to Gatinaeus in order to prove that St. Robert and St. Peter Canisius (and, incidentally, Dominic Bannez) had departed from the old theological tradition by the issuance of their own formulae. Actually, however, Launoy was much more gifted in the line of literary research than in the way of theological insight. The *fidelis* and the *catholicus* are, of course, members of the Catholic Church, recognizable as such. All St. Robert and the other great ecclesiologists did was to state explicitly what were the requisites for membership and to insert these requisites into their own definitions. Those who complain of a "narrow Bellarminian approach" as distinct from the old, traditional Catholic teaching about the Church imitate Launoy in his lack of understanding, even if they do not always exhibit anything like his erudition.

called Christian, yet they are of the Church that includes all the faithful from Abel until the end of the world. But this does not seem to be satisfactory because, after the coming of Christ, there is no true Church except that which is properly called Christian. If, therefore, the catechumens are not of this, then they are not of any [true Church]. I answer therefore that the statement to the effect that no one is saved outside of the Church must be understood as applying to those who neither in reality nor by desire *(de iis, qui neque re ipsa, nec desiderio)* are of the Church, as the theologians commonly speak with reference to Baptism.[19]

It would appear that St. Robert erred in ascribing the teaching that a man can now belong to the Church considered in terms of its broad definition, while not belonging to the Church considered as the Church militant of the New Testament, to Melchior Cano. Yet the great Doctor of the Church was perfectly right in teaching that it is impossible now, since the advent of Jesus Christ, to belong to the Church other than by belonging to the only true Church of the New Testament, the society of the disciples of Jesus Christ, which is the Roman Catholic Church. And his warning is especially important for students of sacred theology in our own times.

There are those who imagine, in spite of the clear teaching of the *Suprema haec sacra,* that the dogma which teaches that no one at all can be saved outside of the Catholic Church means that a man has to be a member of the Church at the moment of his death in order to attain to the possession of the Beatific Vision. Because they realize that individuals who pass from this life without ever having become Catholics can attain to eternal salvation, they imagine themselves obliged to dream up some way in which some non-Catholics can be called members of the true Church. Thus they try to make themselves and others believe that a man can be a member of the Church considered as the redeemed human race, as redeemed human nature, or as some other types of spiritual reality, without enjoying membership in the juridical society known as the Catholic Church.

Ultimately the somewhat ingenious explanations of these men run afoul of the great truth which St. Robert alleged against the false theory that was being taught in his time. There is only one Church of Jesus Christ. The man who is not a member of the

[19] *De ecclesia militante,* c. 3.

Roman Catholic Church is not a member of the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ. It is the great and paradoxical truth of God's dispensation with men in the economy of the New Testament that the Mystical Body of His Son is an organized society. It is composed of its members. And the men who constitute this society, the kingdom of God described in the parables of the Gospels, are the men who are bound to Our Lord and to one another by the outward bonds of ecclesiastical unity. This society lives by faith and hope and charity. But, in God's merciful design, it is a society made up of members who are members or parts of the Church by reason of the fact that they possess this outward bond of union. The true Church of Jesus Christ, according to the dispensation of the New Testament, is the visible Roman Catholic Church. And it is this one Church alone.

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Answers to Questions

RIGGED TELEPHONE CALLS

Question: In my town it has become a very common custom to get the benefit of a telephone call without incurring any expense. This is an example: A salesman goes on a business trip to a distant city, and wishes to let his wife know that he has arrived safely. He has previously arranged with her that he will make a long-distance call to his home as soon as he arrives at his destination. His wife is waiting for this call at the prearranged time, but does not answer the telephone. After the telephone has rung five times, he hangs up and then gets his money back, since the call was not completed. He has communicated the desired message to his wife without having to pay anything for it. What about the morality of this practice?

Answer: I have heard of the procedure described by our correspondent, and I believe it is practiced on a wide scale. Indeed, I was told of a case in which a call was made from Honolulu to New York and a message satisfactorily conveyed to the party expecting it, without the payment of a single cent. I have heard of a business firm which has a code arrangement with its travelling salesmen, whereby a personal call is made to the store from a distant city with the request to speak with some fictitious character—Jack Smith, Bill Brown, Tom White, etc.—each name intended to communicate a particular message pertaining to the business. Of course, the clerk who takes the call in the store knows that it is a rigged message, and says that the individual requested is out of town for the day and no one knows where he is. The salesman at the other end cancels the call and gets his money back, but the message has been conveyed. (I believe that in some instances there is a charge for such a call but it is very small compared to what would be required if the call were completed).

What is to be said of the morality of such practices? I cannot see how they can be justified and I believe that those who use this procedure to convey messages without paying for them are guilty of

a violation of commutative justice, the gravity of which is to be measured by the amount of money an honest telephone call would cost. One who has taken part in such a procedure is bound *per se* to make restitution to the telephone company. (I say *per se,* because one who has acted in good faith might *post factum* be treated with leniency).

The excuse is sometimes given that such calls cost the companies almost nothing, since the expenses for operators, electricity, etc., would be practically the same if such calls were not made. But those who bring up this excuse do not seem to realize that payment for a commodity is to be measured, not merely by the expense incurred by the one who provides it, but also by the benefit that comes to the purchaser. Those who take part in the dishonest procedures described above derive a benefit that is worth a sum of money which they would have to pay if they did not use a deceitful method of avoiding it. It is similar to the case of a person who steals into a movie without buying a ticket. Actually, the expense incurred by the theater is no more than if he were not present (presuming that his presence does not keep out one who is willing to pay). Yet, by getting the benefit of the show without paying, he commits a sin against commutative justice.

Some people argue: "The telephone company knows that this trickery is going on and does nothing about it. Hence, the company can be presumed to condone the practice." But this is a very weak argument. If a person knows that someone is taking or using his property in an unjust manner and does nothing about it *when he could stop the procedure,* he can be presumed to permit the use or taking of his goods. But when nothing is done *because nothing can be done* to stop the dishonest practices, there is no condonation. Evidently, this latter is the case when there is question of rigged telephone calls. We can be sure that if the companies could stop this method of cheating, they would do so. But up to the present there is no way to stop it. I have heard that the telephone companies lose millions of dollars every year through the clever use of their facilities by people who pay nothing in return for the service they receive.

Sad to say, some Catholics employ the dishonest procedure described above to get the benefit of telephone calls without any

expense. Priests could very well make this problem the subject of a sermon or instruction, in the hope that they can persuade their people to abstain from these violations of the seventh commandment.

TESTING A CLERK'S HONESTY

Question: A businessman employs a clerk and wishes to have the assurance that he is perfectly honest. Accordingly, he leaves some money where the clerk can find it and probably believe that it dropped from someone's pocket. If he announces it and tries to find the owner, he will be judged honest; if he keeps it, he will be considered dishonest and will lose his job. Is the businessman permitted to act in this way, submitting the clerk to temptation?

Answer: In such a case it would be lawful to provide an occasion of sin to the clerk, permitting the possibility of sin, because of the benefit which will be derived to the business firm from the assurance that he is honest. Regarding this case Merkelbach, O.P., says: "Generally a person is guilty of passive scandal who deliberately does something which will be an occasion of sin for another. However, there is an exception for a just and proportionate reason, provided the action does not actively induce to sin and is indifferent." He then goes on to give as an example of this exception a man who leaves money around carelessly or in an open box in order to give an occasion of sin to his children or servants, thus permitting one theft in order that many may be avoided. It is true, this theologian adds, that he is speaking of children or servants "inclined or prepared to steal." But I believe that, in view of the widespread practices of dishonesty nowadays, positive proof of honesty can reasonably be required of every employee whose job gives him the opportunity to steal.

A CONDITION *DE FUTURO* IN SACRAMENTAL ABSOLUTION

Question: If a priest recites the sacramental form of Penance over a penitent with the intention to absolve him only on condition that he *will* make restitution, the absolution is invalid, according to all authors, even if the act of restitution takes place shortly afterwards. The reason given is that in this case the matter and

form are not sufficiently united. Yet, if the priest forgets to absolve a penitent and then goes out from the confessional and finds him at the altar rail, he can absolve him validly, even though there is no repetition of the confession or of the act of contrition. There seems to be an inconsistency in these two solutions. Why is not the sacrament valid in the first case, if the interval between the absolution and the actual restitution is very brief?

Answer: The basic reason seems to be that the sacrament of Penance has been established by Christ *per modum judicii.* Now a judgment by its very nature demands that the sentence *follow* the presentation of the case, not precede it. It would be utterly incongruous if a judge pronounced sentence on an accused person before hearing the case. Similarly it would be entirely wrong for a priest to absolve a penitent before some of the matter pertinent to the case (in the instance given above, the actual restitution) was present. On the other hand, there is no incongruity in bestowing absolution if an interval has passed after the matter has been presented in its integrity, as when the priest who had forgotten to give absolution in the confessional later finds the penitent at the communion rail. It should be added that the problem proposed by our correspondent differs from the case in which the priest intends to bestow absolution only if the penitent *intends here and now* to make restitution. In this case all that comes under the intention to absolve is here and now present.

WHAT TO DO WITH A RELIC OF ST. PHILOMENA

Question: I had a relic of St. Philomena displayed in my church until the recent decree banning the veneration of this person. I have removed the relic from the church, but now I should like to know what to do with it.

Answer: I presume the questioner is speaking of a relic from the bones discovered in the catacombs in 1802, and thought by some to have been the body of a virgin martyr, though we know now that there is no reason for believing that this person was a martyr or saint. As to the disposal of such a relic, I suggest that the seal be broken and removed, and any document testifying to the authenticity of the relic be burned. Then the piece of bone should be removed from the case and buried in some spot where

it can disintegrate gradually. Indeed, I am of the opinion that it could be burned, since it is so small that the law forbidding the cremation of the bodies of Christians would not apply to it, just as it would not apply to the disposal of an extracted tooth.

FRANCIS J. CONNELL, C.SS.R.

A NEW RITE?

Question: What is to be said about the suggestion made by some rubricians, viz. that at a solemn Mass the celebrant go to the bench after singing the oration and remain there until the time for the *Credo* or Offertory, meanwhile performing the necessary functions, such as blessing the subdeacon after the singing of the Epistle, the deacon before singing of the Gospel, as well as blessing the incense before the Gospel procession?

Answer: Although I recognize that this suggestion shows great ingenuity, and is proposed by imposing authorities, I am reluctant to accept or recommend it. It seems to me to be introducing a new rite, to be practically turning the ordinary solemn Mass into a Pontifical Mass or a Dominican rite Mass. It is true that these early rites furnish us with a good solution of what to do with the celebrant at a time when he has been rendered temporarily idle by the new rubrics. It is also true that the rubrics of the OHS for *some* of the similar situations in Holy Week (not, however, for Holy Thursday) would seem to point the way to this suggested solution. But it is furthermore true that the OHS gives explicit rubrics for these actions at the bench, whereas the new code of rubrics does not present us with a new rite at the bench. The new rubrics, in fact, say very clearly (#523): "In a solemn Mass the celebrant may sit between the deacon and the subdeacon near the altar at the epistle side while the *Kyrie, eleison,* the *Gloria in excelsis,* the sequence and the *Credo* are being sung. *The rest of the time he stands at the altar* (emphasis mine), or genuflects, as above. These rules apply also to a sung Mass that is not solemn" (Collegeville trans.). The objection is made that the list *Kyrie,* etc. is not taxative; it is difficult, of course, to think of all possibilities; but whether the list is taxative or not the whole tenor of #523 seems to me to be against the proposed action at the bench.

It is not only in the United States that questions have been raised about the foregoing solution. In *The Clergy Review* of May, 1961 you can find an interesting exchange of correspondence between Monsignor Row, of the Westminster Cathedral, and the celebrated liturgist and rubician, Canon J. B. O'Connell. After defending his position, which is the same as that of Father McManus (*Worship*, Jan., 1961, p. 129), Canon O'Connell relents to the extent of saying: "Since I wrote for *The Clergy Review* I have heard—on good authority but not from Rome—that S.R.C. has given a *private* reply to the effect that the celebrant is to remain at the altar 'donec aliter forte provideatur.' This reply does not in the least surprise me. S.R.C., whatever the views of the consultors—is very sensitive, and understandably, about any unauthorized anticipation of its decisions. I opine that the terms of this private reply do not rule out the possibility of a different view becoming tenable eventually." As for me, I shall wait until some provision is—perhaps—made.

PARTICIPATION IN SUNG MASSES

Question: In sung Masses may the faithful answer *Deo gratias* at the conclusion of the Epistle? *Laus tibi, Christe* at the end of the Gospel? May they answer the *Orate, fratres?* May the celebrant say aloud also the rest of the invitation of *Orate, fratres* or must he say only these two words? And what about the *Domine, non sum dignus* before the distribution of holy communion? And the *Deo gratias* at the conclusion of the last Gospel? If the faithful may make these answers at a sung Mass, may they do likewise at a solemn Mass or is this to be done by the ministers?

Answer: To begin with points which are covered specifically in pertinent documents: the faithful may say the triple *Domine, non sum dignus* before holy communion along with the celebrant at a low Mass or at a sung or solemn Mass [Instruction of Sept. 3, 1958, n. 27 (c) and n. 31 (b)]. In the new code of rubrics of July, 1960, among the parts of the Mass to be said aloud in a low Mass, we find: "and the words *Orate, fratres*" (n. 511). The rest of the invitation is therefore to be said quietly *(secreto)*. When the solemn and sung Masses are discussed, however, no specific men-

tion is made of the *Orate, fratres.* We are told that the celebrant sings certain things; that *"he begins in chant* the *Gloria* and the *Credo* when they are to be said"; that *"he says aloud* the formulas at the communion of the faithful and the words of the blessing at the end of the Mass"; and that *"he says in a suitable voice* the parts to which the sacred ministers are to respond." It would seem, therefore, since the *Orate, fratres* is not listed among the things said aloud, that the answer is to come from the sacred minister or server at sung Masses, not from the faithful; this, in spite of the fact that the OHS of 1956 carried a new rubric for these two words: *clara et elevata voce.* As for the *Deo gratias* and *Laus tibi, Christe,* I think these responses should, in sung Masses, high or solemn, be left to the ministers or servers.

MASS OF A COMMEMORATED SAINT

Question: Among the changes to be noted in our Missals you have suggested *(The American Ecclesiastical Review,* January, 1961, p. 55, #4): "mark as *commemorations* all the old *simplex* Masses and, in addition . . ." (here are mentioned other specific feasts). How is it that the 1961 Ordo gives us a choice of offering the Mass of St. Blaise on Feb. 3, if it is to be marked as a "commemoration"? A further question: The Sisters of Mercy have always celebrated their community feast on Sept. 24, Our Lady of Ransom, which is one of the feasts you list among the new "commemorations." Would the Mass of Our Lady of Ransom be allowed for the same reasons which have permitted the Mass of St. Blaise?

Answer: The new code of rubrics (#303, *b*) reads: "the Mass of a commemoration occuring in the Office of the day, and the Mass of a mystery, Saint, or Blessed whose entry is given on that day in the Martyrology or in an appendix to the Martyrology approved for the respective churches can be said only if a liturgical day of the 4th class occurs" (Collegeville trans.). Since Feb. 3, 1961 was a feria, a 4th class liturgical day, it was possible to offer the Mass of the commemorated Saint, St. Blaise. The same possibility will occur on Sept. 24, but not in 1961. This year, Sept. 24 will fall on a Sunday, with the result that Our Lady of Ransom will not even be commemorated.

BENEDICTION PROBLEMS

Question 1: Would you please comment on a not uncommon custom where the celebrant at Benediction carries the monstrance, etc. while going to and retiring from the sanctuary?

Answer 1: Matters Liturgical, n. 411, *c*, tells us: "The burse containing the corporal may be brought from the sacristy to the altar by the one who is to officiate at the exposition, unless he is wearing a cope in which case these things shall be brought out beforehand together with the veiled monstrance." Since the cope is to be worn at Benediction (the foregoing refers to exposition only and hence provides for an officiant without cope), the monstrance, etc. should be brought to the altar beforehand. The custom you describe gives us the picture of a "lazy man's load."

Question 2: Is there any regulation against the reading of the *De profundis* or other prayers for the deceased during Benediction?

Answer 2: Once again our faithful and informative *Matters Liturgical* (n. 414, *g*) gives us an answer: "The *De profundis* or the *Miserere* with the verse *Requiem aeternam* and the oration *Fidelium* or *Deus veniae* may be sung or publicly recited during an Exposition, where this is an established practice; but the practice may not be introduced where it does not exist (S.R.C. 2856; 3616; 3748, II)."

JOHN P. MCCORMICK, S.S.

Book Reviews

IL BALUARDO. By Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani. Rome: Edizioni Ares, 1961. Pp. 283. 1400 Italian Lire.

This book contains a collection of addresses and letters by Cardinal Ottaviani. There are twenty-five of these documents in all. The first eight have to do with the activity of the Church as a whole. The next eight deal with the activity of the hierarchy and of the clergy of the Catholic Church. Eight more explain the duties and the privileges of various groups of laymen during our own times. The twenty-fifth and last paper is the Italian text of the famed discourse given by the Cardinal at the Mariological-Marian Congress at Lourdes in September, 1958. The English translation of this and three of the other papers in *Il Baluardo* have been published in previous issues of *The American Ecclesiastical Review*. One of the most consoling to Americans (and, incidentally, to all of those who have devoted their lives to the teaching of sacred theology), is the Italian translation of the letter written by the Cardinal to Catholic University's beloved Father Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., on the occasion of Father Connell's seventieth birthday. The original English text of this letter was published in the June, 1958 issue of *AER*, an issue given over entirely to articles about Father Connell.

The word "baluardo" means "rampart" or "bulwark." The papers which go to make up this book point up the fact that the Catholic Church is the divinely constituted rampart protecting mankind from the evils which threaten and assail it. And, very clearly, they show that Cardinal Ottaviani himself has acted as a rampart defending his beloved Church against the perils of this age.

These brilliantly written pages show very plainly how and why it is that irresponsible elements of the secular press have always treated the Cardinal as a "reactionary," and have done their best to prejudice their gullible readers against him. The pages of *Il Baluardo* make it clear that the Cardinal is aware of the fact that ours is a time of crisis for the Church and for the world, and that he realizes that victory can and must come only through consistent and profound loyalty to Our Lord and His Church. Furthermore it shows the Cardinal's realistic insistence on the fact that there is no genuine loyalty to the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ apart from a firm attachment to the Roman Pontiff, the successor of St. Peter, and, as such, the Vicar of Christ on earth.

Theologians, and for that matter, all Catholics who know their faith, are well aware of the fact that Cardinal Ottaviani is no reactionary. Those who oppose the kind of teaching set forth in *Il Baluardo* do so only because they dislike an accurate and resolute statement of Catholic principles, and because they do not want to have these principles applied to the situation of the world today.

Now in his seventy-first year, Cardinal Ottaviani is one of the truly great churchmen of our century. The papers published in *Il Baluardo* are expressions of the teaching that has made him such a powerful and beneficent influence within the Church in these days.

JOSEPH CLIFFORD FENTON

THE FOUNTAIN OF ARETHUSA. By Maurice Zermatten. Translated by Anne and Christopher Freemantle. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960. Pp. 235. $3.95.

A PRIEST CONFESSES. By Jose Luis Martin Descalzo. Fresno, California: Academy Guild Press, 1960. Pp. 218. $3.95.

The novel of M. Zermatten, winner of the Grand Prix de Littérature in 1959, is a study of good versus evil painted in the extravagant strokes of the French realistic tradition. It is inevitable that the novel should be compared to the work of Bernanos and Bloy, although its author is Swiss by birth.

The story is somewhat similar to a film produced in the United States a few years ago by Alfred Hitchcock called *I Confess*—in which a murderer-penitent seals the lips of a confessor who is consequently involved in the crime through circumstantial evidence.

Although the author's use of the soliloquy as a technique of character exposition produces a tedious wordiness at times, he writes occasionally with a sensitivity that the Freemantle translation admirably captures. The rendering of the cruder French utterances of villain, Jacques Tinembart, however, is less felicitous, and creates the peculiar impression of a person of refinement trying with embarrassed effort to capture the idiom of the slum.

The hero of the novel is Seraphin Clivaz, Curé of the village of Flaches, whose flock is melodramatically unresponsive to his apostolic efforts. The poverty and anticlericalism as portrayed in this novel seem quite unreal at times to the Anglo-Saxon mind; and the good Curé, who seems to consider asceticism possible only in an atmosphere of extreme physical discomfort, does little to remedy the situation besides making angry speeches about the evils of television, refrigerators, and village

dances. This observation is not meant to minimize the genuine poverty in which many village priests actually do live, as much to question the authenticity of the parochial situation as M. Zermatten describes it, and the prudence of Père Clivaz in combatting the evils that he finds.

The Curé immediately upon his arrival antagonizes Tinembart, storekeeper and cafe owner, by trying to bring the consolations of religion to the latter's invalid wife who has been virtually imprisoned by her husband for a period variously described as fifteen or twenty years. Jacques, the symbol of evil, competes with the Curé for the souls of the villagers, offering them luxuries and alcoholic forgetfulness, while the ineffectual and frustrated Curé tries vainly to eke out an existence from the barren earth.

The struggle reaches a climax when a crippled servant girl is slain by Tinembart who successfully casts suspicion on the priest who absolves him at the scene of the crime. Evil seems triumphant. The innocent priest is accused and vilified and thoroughly discredited as both a lecher and murderer. During his consequent imprisonment he dies of pneumonia, an uncomplaining victim of injustice.

But the mills of God begin to grind with the arrival of the new Curé in Flaches who learns of Jacques' guilt from the latter's imprisoned wife. Tinembart is trapped and confesses. The saintly Père Clivaz triumphs in death.

Padre Martin's "priest" story is set in the form of a personal reminiscence of his last year as a seminarian and his early months as a priest. This story too is an interesting psychological study of the faith, idealism, regrets, and fears of the young levite, recorded with almost naive simplicity and charm. The style is anecdotal and the mentality quite Latin. The reader is treated to a series of vignettes of Spanish family life, characters encountered in a railway carriage, the sorrow that follows the death of a newly-ordained priest, chaste memories of charming senorita, the joy of the first Mass, and early priestly ministrations at the scene of a railway wreck.

The latter incident is the only episode that mars the serene tone of this book. The reviewer was reminded of a rather captious critic, Mariano Garcia, who referred to the contemporary style of Spanish writing as *Nadalismo,* a literary genre characterized by a "studied addiction to plotlessness and inertia." (The first winner of the *Premio Nadal* was a novel appropriately called *Nada* in which nothing in particular took place).

By the standards of the more sophisticated Anglo-Saxon reader who has been inundated in cultural pathology, nothing in particular seems

to take place in Padre Martin's modest book, but a more sympathetic critic will find a serene charm even while he suspects that the young priest is rather immature for the assumption of his pastoral duties.

ROBERT PAUL MOHAN, S.S.

Books Received

CHRISTIANS IN THE WORLD. By Jacques Leclercq. Translated by Kathleen Pond. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961. Pp. x + 174. $3.50.

PRÊTRES ET MONDE OUVRIER. By Paul Barrau. Paris: Les Éditions Ouvriéres, 1961. Pp. 271. 6,90 NF.

THE READER'S GUIDE TO EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY. By A. J. Hoppe. New York: Dutton & Co., 1961. Pp. xx + 424. No price given.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE CHRISTIAN MISSION. Edited and with an introduction by Gerald H. Anderson. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961. Pp. xvii + 341. $6.50.

HUMAN PERSONALITY AND ITS SURVIVAL OF BODILY DEATH. By F. W. H. Myers. New York: University Books, Inc., 1961. Pp. 416. $10.00.

THE NEW TIME RELIGION. By Claire Cox. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1961. Pp. viii + 248. $3.95.

NEW AND ETERNAL TESTAMENT. By P. M. Laferriere. Translated by Roger Capel. Westminster: The Newman Press, 1961. Pp. 287. $3.95.

JOY TO MY YOUTH. By the Rev. Harold A. Buetow. New York: Dutton & Co., 1961. Pp. 208. $3.50.

HENRY VIII AND LUTHER. By Erwin Doernberg. California: Stanford University Press, 1961. Pp. xiv + 139. $3.50.

LITURGICAL HANDBOOK FOR HOLY MASS. By Rev. Johannes Baur. Translated by Rev. David Heimann. Westminster: Newman Press, 1961. Pp. xiv + 146. $2.95.

WAR AND CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE: HOW SHALL MODERN WAR BE CONDUCTED JUSTLY? By Paul Ramsey. Durham, N. Carolina: Duke University Press, 1961. Pp. xxiv + 331. $6.00.

THE WORD, CHURCH AND SACRAMENTS IN PROTESTANTISM AND CATHOLICISM. By Louis Bouyer. New York: Desclee Co., 1961. Pp. 80. $2.00.

SECRETS OF SUCCESSFUL RECRUITING: THE PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE AND TESTED TECHNIQUES OF AMERICA'S MOST SUCCESSFUL RELIGIOUS LEADERS. By Godfrey R. Poage, C.P. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1961. Pp. xxviii + 219. $3.50.

THE STORY OF FATHER DOMINIQUE PIRE. As told to Hugues Vehenne. Translated by John L. Skeffington. New York: Dutton & Co., 1961. Pp. ix + 220. $4.50.

SEARCHLIGHTS ON CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY. By Nels F. S. Ferré. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. Pp. xii + 241. $4.50.

CHANGE THE WORLD FROM YOUR PARISH. A Christopher Handbook. By James Keller, M.M. New York: Guild Press, 1961. Pp. xi + 468. 75¢.

MARIE L'ÉGLISE ET LA RÉDEMPTION. By Société Canadienne D'Études Mariales. Ottawa: The University of Ottawa, 1961. Pp. viii + 280. 22,5 cm.

ISRAEL ACCORDING TO HOLY SCRIPTURES. By various authors. Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Ingram Press, 1961. Pp. 45. 50¢.

LIVING WITH GOD. By. J. M. Perrin, O.P. St. Louis: Herder, 1961. Pp. xiii + 165. $3.25.

CHATS WITH OUR LADY. By P. J. Gearon, O.Carm. Chicago: The Carmelite Third Order Press, 1961. Pp. viii + 200. $2.00.

CHILD OF CALVARY, MARTYR OF SATAN. By Edmund E. R. Elliott, O.Carm. Chicago: The Carmelite Third Order Press, 1961. Pp. 171. $3.00.

CHRIST AND US. By Jean Danielou. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961. Pp. xi + 236. $3.95.

THEOLOGY IN THE CATHOLIC COLLEGE. By Reginald Masterson, O.P. Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press, 1961. Pp. viii + 343. $3.95.

A PRIMER OF PRAYER. By Joseph McSorley, of the Paulist Fathers. New York: Paulist Press, 1961. Pp. viii + 120. 75¢.

FOUR GREAT ENCYCLICALS OF POPE PIUS XII. Discussion Club Outlines by Gerald C. Treacy, S.J. New York: Deus Books, Paulist Press. 1961. Pp. 224. 95¢.

PERSONAL PROBLEMS. A Selection of Articles from Information Magazine edited by Kevin A. Lynch, C.S.P. New York: Paulist Press, 1961. Pp. 128. 75¢.

WHAT ABOUT YOUR DRINKING? By John C. Ford, S.J. New York: Paulist Press, 1961. Pp. 128. 75¢.

IMAGES AND SYMBOLS. By Mirces Eliade. Translated by Philip Mairet. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961. Pp. 189. $3.50.

THE LIFE OF SAINT PETER THOMAS. By Daphne Pochin-Mould. Dea Isle City, New Jersey: Garden Publishing Co., 1961. Pp. 131. $1.50.

THE RELIGIOUS ISSUE IN THE STATE SCHOOLS OF ENGLAND AND WALES, 1902-1914. By Benjamin Sacks. Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1961. Pp. xi + 292. $5.00.

THE CATHOLIC ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PRINCIPAL. By Sister M. Jerome Corcoran, O.S.U. Milwaukee, Wisc.: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1961. Pp. vii + 479. $6.50.

THE IMITATION OF ST. AUGUSTINE. By Abbe Petit. Translated by Fergus Murphy. Dublin: Clonmore & Reynolds Ltd., London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1961. Pp. iv + 96. 8/6d.

THE BREAD OF LIFE. By Georges Bonnet, Translated by Fergus Murphy. Dublin: Clonmore & Reynolds Ltd., London: Burns Oates Ltd., 1961. Pp. 80. 8/6d.

A CHRISTIAN IN THE WORLD. By P. de Locht. Translated by the Earl of Wicklow. Dublin: Clonmore & Reynolds Ltd., London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1961. Pp. 54. 5/-d.

A NEW LIGHT ON THE MASS. By Abbot Bernard Capelle, O.S.B. Translated by a Monk of Glenstal. Dublin: Clonmore & Reynolds, Ltd., London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1961. Pp. 68. 3/6d.

ST. FRANCIS OF ASSISI. By Olive Scanlan. Dublin: Clonmore & Reynolds, Ltd., London: Burns Oates Ltd., 1961. Pp. 87. 8/6d.

COLLEGE SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY. By Anthony F. Alexander. Chicago: Regnery Co., 1961. Pp. xiv + 270. $3.00.

SEEKING THE KINGDOM. Edited by Reginald Masterson, O.P. St. Louis: Herder, 1961. Pp. xviii + 306. $5.25.

BOYS. By T. G. Siekmann. New York: Wagner, 1961. Pp. 190. $3.95.

COMPENDIUM OF PASTORAL MEDICINE. By Dr. Albert Niedermeyer. Translated by Fulgence Buonanno, O.F.M. New York: Wagner, 1961. Pp. xxvi + 492. $7.95.

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